Relative Hemispheric Involvement During Arousal and Inhibition of Affect by Shearer, Steven L.
University of North Dakota
UND Scholarly Commons
Theses and Dissertations Theses, Dissertations, and Senior Projects
8-1-1979
Relative Hemispheric Involvement During Arousal
and Inhibition of Affect
Steven L. Shearer
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/theses
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses, Dissertations, and Senior Projects at UND Scholarly Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of UND Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
zeineb.yousif@library.und.edu.
Recommended Citation
Shearer, Steven L., "Relative Hemispheric Involvement During Arousal and Inhibition of Affect" (1979). Theses and Dissertations. 2514.
https://commons.und.edu/theses/2514
\RELATIVE HEMISPHERIC INVOLVEMENT DURING AROUSAL 
AND INHIBITION OF AFFECT
by
Steven L. Shearer
Bachelor of Science, Bethany Nazarene College, 1974 
Master of Arts, University of North Dakota, 1976
A Dissertation
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty 
of the
University of North Dakota 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy
Grand Forks, North Dakota
August
1979
This Dissertation submitted by Steven L. Shearer in partial ful­
fillment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
from the University of North Dakota is hereby approved by the Faculty 
Advisory Committee under whom the work has been done.
Dean of the Graduate School
ii
Permission
Title ______RELATIVE HEMISPHERIC INVOLVEMENT DURING AROUSAL AND
______INHIBITION OF AFFECT_______________________________
Department PSYCHOLOGY_________________________________________
Degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY_______________________________
In presenting this dissertation in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for a graduate degree from the University of North 
Dakota, I agree that the Library of this University shall make it 
freely available for inspection. I further agree that permission 
for extensive copying for scholarly purposes may be granted by the 
professor who supervised my dissertation work or, in his absence, 
by the Chairman of the Department or the Dean of the Graduate 
School. It is understood that any copying or publication or other 
use of this dissertation or part thereof for financial gain shall 
not be allowed without my written permission. It is also under­
stood that due recognition shall be given to me and to the Univer­
sity of North Dakota in any scholarly use which may be made of any 
material in my dissertation.
Signature
Date_ v M 6  5. > 9 7 8
H i
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to thank my committee members, Don Tucker, Ph.D., 
James Clark, Ph.D., James Antes, Ph.D., J. Dennis Murray, Ph.D., and 
Lowell Thompson, Ed.D., for their helpful assistance in the refinement 
of this study and the resulting manuscript.
I especially wish to thank Don Tucker who has provided the 
impetus for my interest in this area specifically, and my interest in 
doing research generally. Don provided adept supervision from the 
formative stages of the study through the completion of the manuscript. 
Special thanks also to Jim Clark for his willingness to share his 
statistical expertise, but more importantly, for his contributions to 
my development as a clinician.
I also wish to thank Marsha Sitz, Bruce Stenslie, and Dick 
Tracy, who provided valuable assistance in data collection, and my 
wife, Peggy, who always provides invaluable support.
This dissertation, as a symbol of another hurdle crossed, is 
dedicated to my parents, Ruth and Earl Shearer, who taught me that 
education and achievement are valuable, fulfilling adjuncts to living, 
yet not the essence of, or reason for living.
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................
LIST OF TABLES ..............................................
ABSTRACT ....................................................
Chapter
I. INTRODUCTION AND REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ............
Introduction
Theoretical Accounts of Hemispheric Lateralization 
Subcortical versus Hemispheric Contributions to 
Emotionality
Studies of Individuals with Brain Lesions 
Studies of Individuals with Functional Disorders 
Studies of Intact, "Normal" Individuals 
Summary and Implications for Theory Building 
The Present Study
II. METHOD ................................................
Selection of Affective Visual Stimuli 
Subj ects
Attentional Bias Task
Procedure
Other Measures
III. RESULTS ..............................................
Psychological Arousal and Physical Arousal across 
Treatment Conditions 
Attentional Bias Difference Score Means 
Prediction of Attentional Bias Using Subject Variables 
Selected Correlational Results
Categorization of Subjects' Descriptions of Subjective 
States
Other Results
IV. DISCUSSION ............................................
Page
iv
vii
viii
1
26
35
49
Page
Appendices
A. CONSENT FORM AND ASSESSMENT MATERIALS ..................... 59
B. ADDITIONAL D A T A ..........................................  66
REFERENCE NOTES ................................................  72
REFERENCES......................................................  74
vi
LIST OF TABLES
Table Page
1. Multiple Regression: Positive-Inhibition Attentional
Bias X Subjects’ Self-Ratings ...........................  38
2. Multiple Regression: Positive-Facilitation Attentional
Bias X Subjects' Self-Ratings . . . . . . . .  ..............  38
3. Multiple Regression: Negative-Inhibition Attentional
Bias X Subjects' Self-Ratings ...........................  39
4. Multiple Regression: Negative-Facilitation Attentional
Bias X Subjects' Self-Ratings ...........................  39
5. Correlations between Trait Anxiety Inventory Scores and
Subjects' Self-Ratings ....................................  41
6. Correlations between Sex-Guilt Inventory Scores and
Subjects' Self-Ratings.....................   42
7. McNemar Test of Change: Classifiable Reports of
Arousal and Inhibition Strategies ........................  46
8. McNemar Test of Change: Classifiable Reports of
Arousal and Inhibition Strategies During
Positive Affect ..........................................  47
9. McNemar Test of Change: Classifiable Reports of
Arousal and Inhibition Strategies During
Negative Affect ..........................................  47
10. Descriptive Data For All Variables............................ 66
11. Correlational Matrix For All Variables . . . . . . . . . . . .  67
12. Additional Multiple Regression Data ........................  68
13. Attentional Bias Difference Scores For Subjects Whose Self-
Reports Were Classifiable As Imaginal/Global During 
Facilitation And Verbal/Analytic During Inhibition ......... 69
14. Analysis of Sex Differences (df=l,46)...........................70
ABSTRACT
The predominant view of hemispheric contributions to emotional­
ity focuses upon the inherent emotionality of the right hemisphere, in 
contrast to the logical, rational, nonemotional characteristics of the 
left hemisphere. However, recent research has also implicated contri­
butions of the left hemisphere during affective arousal (d'Elia & Perris, 
1973, 1974; Ehrlichman & Wiener, Notes 10, 11; Harman & Ray, 1977;
Tucker, Antes, Stenslie & Barnhardt, 1978; Tucker, Roth & Shearer, Note 
7). Some reports have implicated the left hemisphere in negative affect 
(Ehrlichman & Wiener, Notes 10, 11; Harman & Ray, 1977), and the right 
hemisphere in positive affect (Ehrlichman & Wiener, Notes 10, 11).
Others have suggested interactional conceptualizations of hemispheric 
contributions to emotionality (e.g., Bakan, Note 5; Galin, 1974, 1977; 
Tucker, Note 12), for which tentative empirical support has been 
reported (Tucker, Antes, Stenslie & Barnhardt, 1978; Tucker, Roth & 
Shearer, Note 7). From an interactional viewpoint, a given hemisphere 
is neither inherently rational or emotional, nor inherently positive or 
negative: subjective emotion is a result of the interaction between the 
primitive, spontaneous right hemisphere and the inhibiting, constricting 
left hemisphere.
The present study sought to lend direction to further theorizing 
about the role of the cerebral hemispheres in emotionality through vary­
ing both the positive vs. negative dimension of the affective state, and
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the inhibitory vs. facilitative orientation with which the individual 
approaches affective arousal. Sexual arousal and aversive arousal were 
chosen as prototypic examples of affective arousal with positive and 
negative valences, respectively. Prescreened sexual and aversive slides 
were shown individually to 48 Introductory Psychology students (24 
males, 24 females), under instructions to either facilitate or inhibit 
arousal. During each of the four counterbalanced, within-subjects con­
ditions (i.e., positive-inhibit, positive-facilitate, negative-inhibit, 
negative-facilitate), relative hemispheric activation was assessed via 
an index of auditory attentional bias (Kinsbourne, 1970; Tucker, Antes, 
Stenslie & Barnhardt, 1978).
No direct indication of differential hemispheric involvement, as 
evidenced by mean attentional bias across conditions, was observed for 
the grouped data; a slight right bias was evident across conditions. 
Prediction of attentional bias using subject involvement ratings sug­
gested that both success in generating aversive arousal and lack of suc­
cess in inhibiting aversive arousal were accompanied by relatively 
greater right hemisphere involvement. However, greater right hemisphere 
activation was characterized by less physical arousal, thus emphasizing 
the heterogeneous nature of aversive arousal. Trait Anxiety Inventory, 
Sex-Guilt Inventory, and Stroop Color-Word Test scores were not effec­
tive predictors of attentional bias.
Under instructions to facilitate arousal, subjects tended to 
report cognition characterized by imagery, global perception of the 
slides, and absence of internal verbal dialogue. Under instructions to 
inhibit arousal, subjects tended to report cognition characterized by 
internal verbal dialogue, analytic perception of the slides, and absence
ix
of imagery. Parallels were drawn between the differential cognitive 
strategies reported by subjects across the facilitation vs. inhibition 
dimension, and the differential processing characteristics of the cere­
bral hemispheres. These categorical data suggest relatively greater 
right hemisphere involvement during facilitation of arousal and rela­
tively greater left hemisphere involvement during inhibition of arousal, 
across both positive and negative affect. This result was not corrobo­
rated by attentional bias data; possible difficulties with the atten- 
tional bias paradigm are discussed.
The attentional bias data do not support earlier reports that 
the left hemisphere is characterized by negative affect (Ehrlichman & 
Wiener, Notes 10, 11; Harman & Ray, 1977), while the right hemisphere is 
characterized by positive affect (Ehrlichman & Wiener, Notes 10, 11).
In the present study, the facilitation of aversive arousal was character­
ized by less left and more right hemispheric involvement, while the 
results for sexual arousal were insignificant. Categorical analyses of 
subjects' descriptions of their experience provide tentative support for 
a model of hemispheric contributions to emotionality which focuses upon 
the interaction between an inhibiting, constricting left hemisphere and 
a primitive, spontaneous right hemisphere. Implications for future 
research, psychopathology, and psychotherapy are discussed.
x
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION AND REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Introduction
The search for more adequate understanding of behavior inevita­
bly leads scientists to the study of the nervous system generally, and 
more specifically in the case of "higher order" human behaviors, to the 
cerebral cortex. The study of brain function has oscillated from an 
extreme focus on widespread localization of function espoused by the 
pseudoscience of phrenology during the early 19th century, to the reac­
tionary extreme focus on unitary brain function proposed by Flourens in 
the mid-1800's. Current views on localization of cortical function, 
which fall somewhere between these extremes, as well as current interest 
in hemispheric lateralization of functions, are both indebted to Broca's 
discovery of a dominant hemisphere speech center in 1861.
Progress in localizing cortical functions was furthered by the 
extensive research of Karl Lashley (e.g., 1950) on the effects of brain 
lesions on problem solving, learning, and perceptual discrimination. 
Goldstein's (1939) emphasis upon the unitary quality of the organism 
discouraged interest in localization until Penfield and his colleagues 
revived and refined methods of electrical stimulation of the brain. 
Penfield (1958) "mapped" the cerebral cortex's motor, sensory, and asso­
ciation areas according to subjects' verbal reports and motoric behavior
1
2in response to weak electrical stimulation applied directly to the 
cortex.
Taken as a whole, research on cortical localization of behavior 
yields the generalization that a high degree of localization can be 
demonstrated for more specific functions such as simple sensory and 
motor responses. However, less specific or higher order behaviors mani­
fest less apparent localization. The degree and quality of localized 
brain function in more complex, characteristically human behaviors 
remains largely a matter of speculation.
During the past decade, interest in the cortical localization of 
function has focused most intently upon the differential specialization 
of the brain's cerebral hemispheres. The apparent impetus for recent 
interest in the possible functional differences between the hemispheres 
was the work of Sperry, Bogen, Gazzangia and their various colleagues at 
California Institute of Technology (Gazzangia, 1967; Nebes, 1974).
During the 1960's, the Cal Tech group produced an impressive array of 
studies on commissurotomy patients (i.e., individuals in whom the corpus 
callosum, and other commissures connecting the halves of the cerebral 
cortex, were cut in an attempt to manage severe epileptic seizures).
From this interesting conglomeration of studies and anecdotes, two 
startling observations emerged which were to ignite a flurry of interest 
in hemispheric specialization: (a) the two hemispheres of the human 
brain are specialized for different cognitive functions— the nondominant 
hemisphere is not merely an insignificant spare part; and (b) when the 
cerebral hemispheres are separated by commissurotomy, each hemisphere 
seems to be capable of maintaining autonomous consciousness as if there
3were two separate brains in the craniums of such individuals and, by 
extrapolation, of intact individuals. Although similar ideas had been 
proposed previously by others (see Galin, 1977), the graphic anecdotes 
and films produced by the Cal Tech group managed to better capture the 
attention of scientists and the laity alike.
The developing laterality Zeitgeist was accompanied by a bur­
geoning mass of research on the lateralization of cognitive and percep­
tual functions (see reviews by Dimond, 1972; and Harnad, Doty, Gold­
stein, Jaynes & Krauthamer, 1977). Without reviewing such research in 
detail, several generalizations seem especially salient in describing 
hemispheric specialization among right-handed individuals in whom the 
left hemisphere is dominant for language functions.^ The left hemi­
sphere is more adept in language and arithmetic operations, supposedly 
due to its characteristic articulate, analytic, and sequential/linear 
manner of processing information. In contrast, the right hemisphere is 
more adept in nonverbal, spatial and musical tasks, supposedly due to 
its characteristic global, holistic and simultaneous/nonlinear manner of 
processing information. In the left hemisphere, data are organized 
according to principles of conceptual similarity, whereas in the right 
hemisphere data are organized according to their structural similarity. 
In other words, apples and oranges are alike for the left hemisphere
■^ -All of the material presented in this study refers to right- 
handed individuals in whom the left hemisphere is dominant for language. 
Lateralization among left-handed individuals is not characterized by 
the same consistency, and thus, they are typically omitted from research 
in this area. For more information on lateralization among left­
handers, see Hecaen and Ajuriaguerra (1964).
4because they are fruit, but for the right hemisphere they are alike 
because they are round (Lezak, 1976).
Research on differential processing within the cerebral hemi­
spheres supports a conceptual model of the duality of brain functions in 
which left hemisphere thinking is characterized by reason, logic, 
science-mindedness, or no-nonsense attention to details; right hemi­
sphere thinking is characterized by intuition, nonverbal perceptiveness, 
inspirational hunches, or uncritical imagination (Lezak, 1976). How­
ever, more ambitious individuals (e.g., McLuhan, as cited in Goleman, 
1977) unencumbered by empiricism, have gone well beyond the data, pro­
claiming in the popular literature that the long-neglected right hemi­
sphere and its capabilities are somehow the key to our individual and 
collective futures. Right hemispheric thinking has been touted as a 
virtue akin to self-actualization, spiritual serenity or nirvana, 
whereas the logical, analytic left hemisphere has been condemned as the 
bane of our technological society. At the opposite end of the spectrum, 
more cynical individuals have declared that much of the hemispheric 
research is the result of dichotomanic, academic hucksters (e.g., 
Gardner, 1978; Goleman, 1977).
Theoretical Accounts of Hemispheric 
Lateralization
As a myriad of investigators sought to delineate the cognitive 
and perceptual differences between the hemispheres and brain function 
evangelists sought to take the message to the people, theoreticians 
sought to account for lateralization in structural, evolutionary, and 
nature/nurture terms. Semmes (1968) proposed that differences in
5hemispheric function could be plausibly explained through examination of 
the neuroanatomical differences between the two halves of the brain.
She suggested that the specialization of the left hemisphere for speech 
and finely articulated sensory-motor function of the contralateral, 
dominant hand is a result of the convergence of input from lower-level 
units of a particular function to a discreet location in the left cor­
tex. Conversely, Semmes suggested that the right hemisphere’s superior 
capability in Gestalt/synthetic processing is due to its diffuse neuro­
anatomical organization which allows input from a variety of modalities. 
Thus, the left hemisphere sacrifices a "complete picture" for finely 
modulated control within a single modality while the right hemisphere 
sacrifices such control for an ability to synthesize all sensory input 
into an overall impression or gestalt. There have been more recent 
attempts to delineate structural differences between the hemispheres 
(Galaburda, LeMay, Kemper, & Geschwind, 1978; Reubens, 1977), but the 
relationship of structural asymmetries to functional asymmetries remains 
a matter of conjecture.
Levy (1969) assumed an evolutionary stance in her theorizing 
about hemispheric specialization. She suggested that specific laterali­
zation of language in the left hemisphere may be a functional adaptation 
permitting control of the vocal apparatus uncomplicated by competition 
between the hemispheres for the motor mechanisms of language expression. 
Similarly, Levy speculates that during human evolution, holistic, 
gestalt-type processing may have been lateralized to the "mute" right 
hemisphere as a consequence of antagonism between perceptual and lan­
guage functions.
6Corballis and Morgan (Note 1) emphasize the importance of a 
maturational left-right gradient which favors earlier or more rapid 
development on the left. They also suggest that the "leading" side—  
typically the left— normally exerts an inhibitory influence on the 
"lagging" side. Thus, as in Levy's thinking, right hemisphere speciali­
zation is thought to occur by default since the leading, inhibiting left 
hemisphere is consumed by speech and complex motor tasks. These authors 
also discuss possible genetic mechanisms for the inheritance of a matu­
rational gradient in light of environmental influences (Morgan & 
Corballis, Note 2).
Subcortical versus Hemispheric 
Contributions to Emotionality
Several lines of research converge in implicating the importance 
of the limbic system (Papez, 1937) in emotional arousal. For example, 
removal of the amygdalas and other portions of the limbic systems of 
rhesus monkeys results in extreme placidity, even towards attacking ani­
mals, and hypersexuality (Isaacson, 1974). Electrical stimulation of 
limbic system structures can produce "sham rage," whereas stimulation 
applied to apparent inhibitory centers can terminate the rage (Delgado, 
1970).
Sham rage can also be observed among decorticate animals in 
response to very slight frustration or provocation. Such affective 
behavior is an integrated expression of rage, but lacks the awareness 
and persistence characteristic of normal emotion. Since such rage reac­
tions are easily released among decorticate animals, it appears that 
cortical processes must normally inhibit the expression of rage.
7However, if the connections between the hypothalmus and the lower neural 
system are severed, only fragmented, uncoordinated emotional expression 
is possible. Thus, it seems that the hypothalmus and other portions of 
the limbic system are essential for the integration and coordination of 
emotional expression, while the cerebral cortex may inhibit, direct, or 
color affective expression.
There is also evidence suggesting a subcortical basis for dif­
ferential qualities of subjective emotions. James Olds and his co­
workers have demonstrated that electrical stimulation of the septal area 
of the limbic system can be a more potent reinforcer for animals than 
food (e.g., Olds & Milner, 1954). Similarly, humans stimulated in 
approximately the same subcortical regions report subjective pleasure.
In contrast, Neal Miller and his co-workers have demonstrated that more 
medial electrical stimulation is highly aversive and that animals will 
learn avoidance responses in order to evade such stimulation (e.g., 
Miller, 1960). Thus, the data reported by Olds and Miller suggest a 
neural substrate for pleasant and aversive subjective emotional arousal. 
This subcortical system has reverberating interconnections with the 
cerebral cortex (i.e., "circuit of Papez") which enable thought to 
affect emotional expression and vice versa.
Whereas earlier efforts to understand brain function and emo­
tionality had largely focused upon the division between the "rational" 
higher neural components and the primitive "emotional" lower neural com­
ponents, recent efforts have focused upon possible differential hemi­
spheric contributions to emotion. Although the limbic system is of cru­
cial importance to emotion, the present study was focused upon the
8contributions of the cerebral hemispheres to the expression of emotion. 
More specifically, the present study was an investigation of possible 
differential hemispheric involvement during positive and negative affect 
and during the arousal and inhibition of emotion.
Compared to the abundance of data on asymmetries of cognitive 
and perceptual functions, there has been a relative dearth of research 
on hemispheric lateralization and emotionality. Most of the research 
concerning possible differential contributions of the hemispheres to 
emotions has been done in the past five years. Results in this novel 
area tend to be inconsistent, if not blatantly paradoxical, and diffi­
cult to replicate. For the present study, the results of research in 
three general areas relevant to laterality and emotionality will be 
briefly reviewed: (a) studies of individuals with brain lesions, (b) 
studies of individuals with functional disorders, and (c) studies of 
intact individuals.
Studies of Individuals with 
Brain Lesions
Perhaps the earliest indication that hemispheric laterality was 
implicated in emotionality was Goldstein's (1939) observation that 
patients with left hemisphere lesions manifested "depressive- 
catastrophic reactions" in response to stress. Conversely, Denny-Brown, 
Meyer and Horenstein (1952) reported a case study in which they 
described a patient with right hemisphere damage who manifested an 
"indifference reaction" quite similar to the classic "la belle indif­
ference" often observed in hysteric conversion disorders.
9More recent studies have reported replicative yet equivocal 
results regarding the affective reactions of unilaterally-lesioned 
patients. Hecaen (1962) reported that specific catastrophic reaction to 
failure occurred significantly more among left-damaged patients and that 
an indifference reaction to failure occurred significantly more among 
right-damaged patients. However, the significantly greater confusional 
disturbances and gross size of lesion among right-damaged patients con­
founds interpretation in terms of lateralization.
Gainotti (1969, 1972) also reported significantly higher inci­
dence of catastrophic reaction categories (e.g., anxiety, tears, refus­
als) among left-damaged patients and significantly higher incidence of 
indifference reaction categories (e.g., indifference, jokes, minimiza­
tion or denial of deficit) among right-damaged patients. Depressive 
categories (e.g., discouragement, declarations of incapacity) did not 
differentiate the two groups. Gainotti (1972) speculated that the left, 
verbal hemisphere should be considered more important from the "intel­
lectual" point of view, and the right, nonverbal hemisphere as more 
important from the "emotional" point of view.
Other studies have reported that right-damaged individuals mani­
fest significantly greater indifference and auditory affective agnosia,
i.e., inability to recognize affective tone (Heilman, Scholes & Watson, 
1975; Tucker, Watson & Heilman, 1976), inability to produce affectively 
toned speech (Tucker et al., 1976), and inability to recall affectively 
toned material (Wechsler, 1973). Psychometric studies have reported 
significantly greater MMPI elevations on scale ID (Gasparrini, Satz, 
Heilman & Coolidge, Note 3), and scales I), Hs, and Sc; (Black, 1975)
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among nonaphasic individuals with left hemisphere lesions. However, 
negative or equivocal results have also been reported (Dikman & Reitan, 
1974, 1977; Vogel, 1962). Another psychometric study suggests that indi­
viduals with left temporal epileptic foci are prone to depressive- 
catastrophic reaction, whereas those with right temporal lobe foci mani­
fest a propensity for greater denial (Bear & Fedio, 1977).
Interpretation of the various unilateral brain damage studies 
has typically focused on the "obvious" implication that damage to one of 
the cerebral hemispheres will diminish the functioning of that hemi­
sphere and, thus, result in a relative dominance of the other hemisphere. 
In other words, from the depressive-catastrophic reactions of left- 
lesioned patients, we could infer that the right hemisphere tends toward 
emotionality or, more specifically, negative affect. However, an often 
neglected article by Hall, Hall and Lavoie (1968) suggests otherwise. 
Right- and left-lesioned groups were clearly differentiated using dis­
criminant analysis of eight Rorschach variables. The results suggest 
that the two groups manifest very different cognitive styles: left- 
damaged patients were found to be constricted and inhibited in their 
ideation and very much aware of their deficit, whereas right-damaged 
patients were found to be expansive and unconstrained in their ideation 
and either unaware or unconcerned about their deficit ("anosognosia"). 
Hall, Hall and Lavoie interpreted their findings as indicative of an 
exaggeration, rather than a decrement, in the damaged hemisphere's nor­
mal contribution to the individual's functioning. Such an exaggeration 
interpretation may be applicable to the results of other brain lesion 
studies. Since the cognitive style of the Hall et al. left-damaged
11
patients approximates depressive ideation familiar to clinicians, per­
haps the depressive-catastrophic reaction often reported following left 
hemisphere insult may reflect an exaggeration of usual left hemisphere 
functioning. Such conjecture awaits empirical verification.
Other early data on possible lateralization of emotionality were 
largely serendipitous results of an innovation called the Wada technique 
(Wada & Rasmussen, 1960), used to determine lateralization of speech 
prior to brain surgery. The Wada technique involves the injection of a 
barbiturate (sodium amytal) into one of the carotid arteries. This 
procedure produces brief impairment of the ipsalateral hemisphere, and 
thus, total contralateral hemiplegia— including speech if the intra­
carotid injection is on the dominant side. Terzian (1964) and Rossi and 
Rosadini (1967) reported that when the injection was made into the left 
carotid artery, a depressive-catastrophic reaction followed, whereas a 
euphoric, sometimes nearly manic, reaction typically occurred following 
right carotid injections. Thus, observations of patients' behavior 
during use of the Wada technique tend to support the findings of the 
brain lesion research. However, caution is necessary in interpreting 
these results both since Milner (1967) has attributed all the emotional 
effects of pharmacological inactivation of one hemisphere to personality 
predisposition, and since patients who undergo this procedure are candi­
dates for brain surgery. There are, of course, certain dangers in all 
generalizations about lateralization and emotionality which are based on 
studies of individuals with brain lesions. As Reitan (1964) has noted, 
the validity of such research and subsequent speculation is always very
12
tenuous since the independent variables were created by "accidents of 
nature."
Studies of Individuals with 
Functional Disorders
As with brain-lesioned patients, generalization about brain 
function from studies of psychiatric patients may necessarily be mis­
leading since a variety of unknown variables may be present among such 
groups. However, the results of such studies, particularly those 
focused on depression and conversion disorders, may provide further
l
direction in understanding the contributions of the cerebral hemi­
spheres to subcortical emotionality among intact, "normal" individuals.
d'Elia and Perris (1973, 1974) utilized electroencephalographic 
(EEG) integration techniques to study relative hemispheric activation 
among two samples of psychotically depressed patients. Their results 
suggest greater involvement of the left hemisphere during depression, 
with left hemisphere involvement roughly proportional to degree of 
depression. The d'Elia and Perris data also suggest a possible shift 
toward greater right hemisphere involvement following electroconvulsive 
therapy (ECT) or Indoklon therapy. Perris (1974) presented EEG evoked 
response data which also demonstrated left hemisphere involvement during 
depression and a contralateral shift after administration of antidepres­
sant medications.
The findings reported by d'Elia and Perris have not been cor­
roborated by several other studies. Involvement of the left hemisphere 
in depression was not supported by a similar EEG study (Marjerrison, 
James & Reichert, 1975). Flor-Henry (1976) and Yozawitz and Bruder
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(Note 4) have reported right hemisphere performance decrements among 
patients with affective disorders. Other data suggest a left temporal 
focus in the inhibited and schizoaffective forms of depression and a 
right temporal lobe focus in agitated depression (Chiofalo, Dorr & Bied- 
ermann, 1977). Furthermore, several studies suggest that ECT is more 
efficacious when applied unilaterally to the right hemisphere (Galin, 
1974), but indeed, this finding is also not without exceptions (Reichert, 
Benjamin, Keegan & Marjerrison, 1976).
Vogel and his colleagues have reported that by depriving 
depressed individuals of REM sleep, the occurrence of which is accom­
panied by greater right hemisphere activation (Bakan, Note 5), the symp­
toms of depression can be reduced (Vogel, Thompson, Thurmond & Rivers, 
1973; Vogel, Thurmond, Gibbons, Sloan, Boyd & Walker, 1975). These 
authors have suggested that the active ingredient of their regimen was 
"REM pressure," rather than mere deprivation, and that this phenomenon 
held for endogenous rather than reactive depression. They also noted 
that a variety of antidepressants disrupt REM sleep. Thus, perhaps 
coerced activation of right hemisphere activity may reduce depression, 
possibly accompanying left hemisphere overactivity. Burtle (Note 6) has 
provided support for this hypothesis by demonstrating that specific 
imagery training (i.e., coerced right hemisphere activity) was related 
to reduced depressive symptomatology.
Galin (1974) theorized that some unconscious processes could be 
mediated by the right hemisphere, independent of the preemptive control 
of the left hemisphere. Ferenczi (1926) had noted that in his clinical 
experience, unilateral hysterical conversion symptoms were more common
14
on the left side of the body. Thus, Galin (1974) suggested that perhaps 
unconscious, right hemisphere processes could be expressed via contra­
lateral somatic disorders. Through retrospective study of case records, 
Galin, Diamond and Braff (1977) and Stern (1977) both found evidence of 
a significant preponderance of left-sided symptoms among patients with 
unilateral conversion disorders, although the Galin et al. results were 
true only among female patients.
Studies of Intact, "Normal"
Individuals
Recent approaches to the study of functional hemispheric asym­
metry among intact persons have focused on lateralized input and output 
modes. Such procedures include dichotic listening tasks and tachisto- 
scopic presentation of visual stimuli to the left and right visual half­
fields (Kimura, 1966, 1967; Springer, 1977), conjugate lateral eye move­
ments (Gur & Gur, 1977; Kinsbourne, 1972), recording of EEG activity 
over the two hemispheres (Galin & Ornstein, 1972) or bilateral recording 
of EEG evoked potentials (Donchin, Kutas & McCarthy, 1977), and observa­
tion of attentional bias (Kinsbourne, 1970; Tucker, Roth & Shearer, Note 
7). Despite the idiosyncratic problems inherent to each of these 
approaches to measuring relative hemispheric activation, they are all 
attempts to circumvent the tenuous generalizability of brain lesion, 
split brain, and psychiatric disorder studies and the intrusiveness of 
the Wada technique. Each of these various approaches has recently been 
applied to the study of possible asymmetries in emotionality.
Kimura's (1967) introduction of dichotic presentation of audi­
tory stimuli as an approach to studying functional lateralization
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initiated considerable research interest in this relatively simple tech­
nique. Dichotic listening tasks involve the presentation of two spoken 
messages, via headphones, one to each of the ears. Each ear sends both 
contralateral and ipsalateral projections to the cortex. However, when 
ipsalateral and contralateral inputs compete in the auditory neural sys­
tem, it is thought that contralateral input inhibits or occludes the 
ipsalateral signals. Thus, right ear superiority for spoken messages is 
thought to reflect the dominance for language of the left hemisphere.
Applying the dichotic listening paradigm to emotionality, King 
and Kimura (1972) and Carmon and Nachson (1973) found a left ear, i.e., 
right hemisphere, advantage for processing of human nonverbal sounds 
(crying, laughing and coughing) for which an acoustic explanation did 
not seem applicable. In similar research, right hemisphere superiority 
was documented for speech contours such as pitch, tempo, inflection and 
stress (Blumstein & Cooper, 1974), and for correct identification of the 
emotional tone of a sentence (Haggard & Parkinson, 1976). Safer and 
Leventhal (1977) used monaural presentations without competing stimula­
tion to support earlier reports of left ear advantage for emotional tone 
of sentences, and also demonstrated right ear advantage for sentence 
content. Similarly, Adair (Note 8) found that left ear reception of 
stimulus words resulted in more archaic free associations than did pre­
sentation to the right ear.
In recent years, the most popular method purporting measurement 
of hemisphericity has been the simple observation and recording of sub­
jects' conjugate lateral eye movements (LEM's) during reflective think­
ing (Bakan, 1971; Gur, 1975). Shifts to the left are presumed to
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reflect right hemisphere predominance, whereas shifts to the right are 
thought to reflect left hemisphere predominance. It has been theorized 
that activation of the cognitive functioning of one hemisphere will 
overflow to the frontal orientation center of that hemisphere and cause 
eye movement contralateral to that hemisphere (Gur, 1975; Kinsbourne, 
1972). Despite such attempts to provide a viable theoretical basis for 
LEM's, the relationship between eye movements and hemisphericity is an 
equivocal, empirical association, based upon an accumulation of studies.
Gur (1975) demonstrated that when the experimenter recorded 
LEM’s from behind the subject, the nature of the cognitive task seemed 
to be the determinant of eye movements during reflective thinking (i.e., 
verbal— right, spatial— left). However, when LEM's were monitored face- 
to-face, subjects evidenced stereotypic LEM's— usually to the left—  
regardless of the cognitive demands of the question. Gur suggested that 
perhaps anxiety disrupted the brain's usual task-oriented processing and 
thus resulted in LEM stereotypy unrelated to the task. Hiscock (1977) 
could not find evidence supporting such an override caused by anxiety, 
but left looking stereotypy has been demonstrated in response to emo­
tional questions (Schwartz, Davidson & Maer, 1975; Schwartz, Davidson, 
Maer & Bromfield, 1974), and during induced stress (Tucker, Roth, Arne- 
son & Buckingham, 1977).
The attraction of a right-looker/left-looker typology has gen­
erated research on possible stable personality correlates of LEM stereo­
typy. Left-lookers have been reported to score higher on scales of 
repression and denial (Gur & Gur, 1975) and responsiveness and
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expressiveness (Woods, 1977), whereas right-lookers have scored higher 
on scales of projection and "turning against others" (Gur & Gur, 1975).
In general, research on LEM stereotypy supports the popular con­
ceptualization of the lateralization of emotion which depicts the right 
hemisphere as a storehouse of unelaborated, primary process, primitive 
emotions with which the individual copes via denial a la Gainotti 
(1969). However, recent reviewers have emphasized that LEM results are 
very tenuous and that theory building based on the LEM literature is 
premature (Ehrlichman & Weinberger, Note 9).
The supposed "emotionality" of the right hemisphere has not been 
unequivocally supported by recent EEG studies. Davidson and Schwartz
(1976) did report greater desynchrony, i.e., activation, of the right 
hemisphere during affective imagination relative to non-affective 
imaginal material. However, other EEG studies suggest that the cerebral 
hemispheres are differentially involved in positive and negative affect. 
Ehrlichman and Wiener (Notes 10, 11) report greater EEG desynchrony over 
the right hemisphere during recall of positive affect and over the left 
hemisphere during recall of negative affect. Similarly, Harman and Ray
(1977) observed increased amplitude of left hemisphere EEG recordings 
during positive affect and decreased amplitude during negative affect, 
i.e., greater left hemisphere activity during negative affect. Harman 
and Ray suggest that their findings parallel those of d'Elia and Perris 
(1974) in demonstrating that the left hemisphere, rather than the right, 
reflects changes in emotionality. The authors speculate that perhaps 
negative affect is viewed more analytically by the individual or sus­
tained by internal verbal dialogue, both supposedly functions of the
left hemisphere.
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Other research on lateralization of emotions has capitalized 
upon the neuroanatomical crossing of visual neural pathways via the 
optic chiasm. Thus, with a tachistoscope, if presentations are rapid 
so as to prevent saccadic eye movements, all of the field to the left 
of a fixation point excites the visual cortex in the right hemisphere 
while stimuli from the right visual field excite the left visual cortex. 
Using this method, in combination with assessment of LEM's and auditory 
attentional bias, Tucker, Antes, Stenslie and Barnhardt (1978) reported 
evidence of hemispheric interaction during affective arousal. Subjects 
who reported high state anxiety in response to contrived anxiety induc­
tion manifested a right visual field, i.e., left hemisphere, perfor­
mance decrement on both verbal and spatial tasks. The authors suggest 
that anxiety imposes a processing load specifically on the left hemi­
sphere, and that this should be accompanied by relative left hemispheric 
activation. Tucker et al. present other data which support their con­
tention: high trait anxious subjects exhibited significant right ear
attentional bias and decreased frequency of left eye movements. Tucker 
et al. interpret their results as suggestive of relative left hemi­
sphere activation accompanied by concomitant left hemisphere perfor­
mance decrement and suppression of right hemisphere activity during 
anxiety. (Similarly, Gur, 1978, has presented data suggesting left 
hemisphere dysfunction and left hemisphere overactivation among schizo­
phrenics .)
Dimond, Farrington and Johnson (1976) devised an innovative 
technique for studying lateralization of emotions which, like tachisto- 
scopic research, depends upon crossing of visual pathways between the
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eyes and the visual cortex. These authors developed special contact 
lenses which, in effect, allow presentation of visual stimuli to a spe­
cific hemisphere. Dimond et al. showed various films in this manner to 
each hemisphere individually. Films shown to the right hemisphere were 
judged by the subjects as being more unpleasant than were films shown to 
the left. According to Dimond et al., left hemisphere perception tends 
to dominate overall perception and typically suppresses right hemisphere 
perception which is characterized as more unpleasant and horrific than 
that of the left hemisphere.
Further support of hemispheric interaction, rather than mere 
dichotic processing, in affective arousal has been reported by Tucker, 
Roth and Shearer (Note 7). Using hypnotically induced mood states of 
depression and euphoria, these authors found a significant right ear 
attentional bias, i.e., presumably left hemisphere activation, during 
the depressive mood state. The right ear attentional bias was accom­
panied by significantly impaired imagery ability, yet no decrement in 
arithmetic performance. Thus, in accord with the Tucker et al. (1978) 
observation regarding apparent hemispheric interaction during anxiety, 
the authors interpret their results as indicative of left hemisphere 
overactivity and concomitant right hemisphere impairment during depres­
sive affect. They also suggest that impaired right hemisphere function­
ing may be a result of active suppression of the right hemisphere by 
the overactive left hemisphere.
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Summary and Implications for 
Theory Building
The predominant view of hemispheric contributions to emotional­
ity localizes emotion as a right hemisphere characteristic, in contrast 
to the logical, rational, nonemotional characteristics of the left hemi­
sphere. Although a considerable volume of research corroborates such a 
conceptualization (e.g., Davidson & Schwartz, 1976; Gainotti, 1972; 
Schwartz, Davidson & Maer, 1975; Schwartz, Davidson, Maer & Bromfield, 
1974; Tucker, Roth, Arneson & Buckingham, 1977), other recent research 
implicates the left hemisphere's involvement in emotionality (e.g., 
d'Elia & Perris, 1973, 1974; Ehrlichman & Wiener, Notes 10, 11; Harman & 
Ray, 1977; Tucker, Antes, Stenslie & Barnhardt, 1978; Tucker, Roth & 
Shearer, Note 7).
Although the research on lateralization of emotionality may well 
seem confusing and paradoxical, perhaps this very nature of the litera­
ture suggests that a new direction in theorizing is imminent. Clearly, 
both the right and left hemispheres appear to make important contribu­
tions to the elaboration and expression of subcortical arousal into 
phenomenologically perceived emotions. This observation points to the 
naivete of continued reliance upon the popular model of brain function 
in which "emotion" resides in the right hemisphere, and "reason" in the 
left. Furthermore, the literature suggests that mere dichotomous attri­
bution of specific emotions (e.g., anxiety, depression) to one hemi­
sphere or the other, will be an inefficient tack for furthering under­
standing of cerebral contributions to emotionality. Recent evidence 
(e.g., Galin, 1977; Tucker et al., 1978; Tucker et al., Note 7) suggests
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that a more fruitful approach to understanding brain function in emotion 
may involve changing our focus from lateralization of the cerebral hemi­
spheres per se, to a model which emphasizes the interaction or integra­
tion of the cerebral hemispheres in emotionality. However, the spe­
cifics of such a model await further conceptual elaboration and empirical 
corroboration.
Several theoreticians have proposed tentative models for explain­
ing cerebral contributions to emotionality via interactional principles. 
Prior to the flurry of activity of recent years, Bogen (1969) hypothe­
sized that certain kinds of left hemisphere activity may directly sup­
press certain kinds of right hemisphere activity. He also suggested 
that some left hemisphere activity may block the access to that hemi­
sphere of certain products of right hemisphere activity, presumably by 
blocking commissural transfer.
Galin (1974) suggests that such inhibition of neural trans­
mission across the cerebral commissures may represent a neurophysio­
logical mechanism for some instances of repression, as well as an ana­
tomical locus for unconscious mental contents, i.e., the right hemi­
sphere (cf. Galin, Diamond & Braff, 1977; Stern, 1977). Galin (1974, 
1977) and Bakan (Note 5) have compared right hemisphere processing to 
what psychoanalysts call primary process thinking, e.g., holistic, non- 
verbal/imaginal representation, nonlinear association, and little 
involvement with perception of time or sequence. According to Bakan, 
such primary process, right hemisphere mentation is typically suppressed 
by the inhibitory influence of the left hanisphere. He cites research 
supporting a "spill over" model of schizophrenia which suggests that a
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breakdown of left hemisphere inhibitory functioning allows primary pro­
cess, right hemisphere contents to "flow” from their usual REM sleep 
expression channels into waking, secondary process mentation and overt 
behavior (cf. Rosenthal & Bigelow, 1972). Thus, for optimal functioning 
a moderate level of inhibitory activity by the left hemisphere is 
presumably necessary.^
Tucker (Note 12) has suggested that the hemispheres are not 
merely differentially specialized, but rather that they are inherent 
opposites which interact in dialectical fashion. Thus, optimal brain 
function is dependent upon a higher order, synergic level of integration 
rather than either dichotomous usage of the "best" hemisphere for a 
given function or an additive hemispheric configuration. The dialecti­
cal flavor of Tucker's model distinguishes it from other conceptualiza­
tions of hemispheric interaction. Thus, whereas many researchers in the 
field speak of opposition or interference between the cerebral hemi­
spheres as a limiting or disruptive phenomenon, Tucker proposes that 
synergic interaction of hemispheric processing is a direct product of 
such opposition between the halves of the brain. According to a dialec­
tical model, therefore, differentiated emotionality is a product of the 
synthesis between the controlling, dominating and inhibiting left
r\
^Bakan (Note 5) actually uses the terms "left hemisphere system" 
and "right hemisphere system" to emphasize his recognition of the sub­
cortical and biochemical components of brain function which are insepa­
rable from hemispheric processing. Such a gesture is certainly laudable 
in this area of research. Too often, research and speculation in the 
area of laterality speaks only of hemispheric processing with no overt 
recognition that this is an artificial separation, a hemispherectomy so 
to speak, which does injustice to the integrative, systemic nature of 
the human nervous system.
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hemisphere, and its opposite, the spontaneous, primitive and syncretic 
right hemisphere.
The views expressed by Bogen, Galiri, Bakan and Tucker all empha­
size the interaction of the cerebral hemispheres, generally, and the 
inhibiting qualities of the left hemisphere, specifically. According to 
these theoreticians, it is insufficient to continue the simple delinea­
tion of the specific capacities of each hemisphere in isolation. One 
hemisphere's contribution to a particular affective state is at least 
partially dependent upon the concomitant influence of the other hemi­
sphere. However, several recent EEG studies appear to conflict with 
such interactive conceptualizations of hemispheric emotionality: left 
hemisphere EEG data suggest a predominance of negative affect (Ehrlich- 
man & Wiener, Notes 10, 11; Harman & Ray, 1977), whereas the right hemi­
sphere is characterized by positive affect (Ehrlichman & Wiener, Notes 
10, 11). However, the findings of Dimond et al. (1976) suggesting the 
predominance of horrific affect in the right hemisphere are difficult to 
reconcile with such a model. As an alternative, from an interactive 
stance, either hemisphere could be characterized by positive or negative 
affect depending upon the concomitant influence of the other hemisphere. 
For example, Tucker, Roth and Shearer (Note 7) have suggested that "a 
variety of primitive, syncretic and spontaneous emotional responses with 
primary elaboration in the right hemisphere could be quite aversive to 
the individual; the inhibition, and potentially the differentiation, of 
such, primary affective arousal by the left hemisphere could result in an 
affective state which is more positive (p. 11)."
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Thus, it is unclear whether the differential contributions of 
the cerebral hemispheres to emotionality are a result of the inherent 
affective tone or cognitive processing predilections of the individual 
hemispheres, i.e., perhaps the left hemisphere is primarily "negative" 
or negative arousal is primarily verbal, whereas the right hemisphere is 
primarily "positive" or positive arousal is primarily nonverbal, or vice 
versa. Alternatively, perhaps it is unnecessary to posit such differ­
ences in favor of an interactional model which emphasizes the constrict­
ing, inhibiting influence of the left hemisphere upon the primitive, 
spontaneous right hemisphere in determining the quality of subjective 
emotionality. Tentative empirical support has been reported for both 
the former (Ehrlichman & Wiener, Notes 10, 11; Harman & Ray, 1977) and 
the latter approaches (Tucker, Antes, Stenslie & Barnhardt, 1978;
Tucker, Roth & Shearer, Note 7); however, a direct comparison of the 
models has not been reported.
The Present Study
The present study was designed to provide further data on the 
equivocal issue of hemispheric contributions to emotionality through 
varying both the positive vs. negative quality of the affective state, 
and the inhibitory vs. facilitative orientation with which the individ- 
ual approaches affective arousal. Comparison of these two dimensions of 
affective arousal according to an attentional bias measure of relative 
hemispheric activation should yield results relevant to a theoretical 
understanding of lateral cerebral function in emotion. In order to 
operationalize such a comparison, aversive and sexual slides were shown
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to subjects under instructions to either facilitate or inhibit arousal, 
with concurrent measurement of auditory attentional bias as an index of 
relative hemispheric activation. Previous research showing the impor­
tance of the right hemisphere to emotion (e.g., Davidson & Schwartz, 
1976; Schwartz et al., 1974; Schwartz et al., 1975; Tucker et al., 1977) 
generally, and to horrific affect (Dimond et al., 1976) and sexual 
arousal (Cohen, Rosen & Goldstein, 1976; Goldstein, Sugerman, Marjerri- 
son & Stoltzfus, Note 13), in particular, would suggest that the facili­
tation of such arousal would result in relatively greater right hemi­
sphere activation. Evidence of left hemisphere involvement in negative 
affect (Ehrlichman & Wiener, Notes 10, 11; Harman & Ray, 1977) would 
suggest differential hemispheric function during positive and negative 
affective arousal. Interactional views (e.,g., Galin, 1974, 1977; Bakan, 
Note 5; Tucker, Note 12) would suggest that primary elaboration or 
facilitation of both positive and negative affect would be associated 
with relatively greater right hemisphere activation, and the inhibition 
of both positive and negative affect with relatively greater left hemi­
sphere activation. The present study was expected to lend direction to 
the further elaboration of theoretical models and, thus, contribute to a 
better understanding of hemispheric contributions to emotionality within 
and across various subjective emotions and perhaps within and across
various individuals.
CHAPTER II
METHOD
Selection of Affective 
Visual Stimuli
Prior to the recruitment of subjects, two slide pools were cre­
ated to serve as stimuli for affective arousal. A pool of 54 sexually- 
oriented color slides was created using photographs from "soft core" 
pornography magazines (e.g., Playboy, Playgirl), depicting individuals 
and heterosexual couples in situations ranging from seductive poses with 
some exposure of genitalia to apparent intercourse. A pool of 24 aver­
sive or repulsive color slides was created using photographs from peri­
odicals, textbooks, and those supplied by a cooperating forensic path­
ologist. These slides depicted various unpleasant scenes such as morgue 
corpses, child abuse victims, starvation victims, snakes, rats, etc.
The combined pool of 78 slides was shown to a group of 52 undergraduates 
in Abnormal Psychology. They were told about the proposed study, and 
asked to rate the suitability of each picture for inclusion in the study 
via a five point "arousal value" scale. The fourteen sexually-oriented 
slides which were ranked as most arousing by each sex were randomly 
assigned to two slide sets of seven slides each; i.e., two seven-slide 
sets for each sex. Since no sex differences were evident on ratings of 
the aversive slides, the fourteen slides ranked as most arousing were 
randomly assigned to two slide sets of seven each to be shown to both
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sexes. Use of these visual stimuli was based on two assumptions: (a) 
college students should be able to use the slides as suggestive stimuli 
which facilitate access to their sexual or horrific imagination, thus 
approximating positive and negative affective states; (b) for a majority 
of the population, the heterosexual slides chosen should have a "posi­
tive" valence, whereas the aversive slides chosen should have a 
"negative" valence.
Subjects
Forty-eight undergraduate psychology students (24 females and 24 
males) were recruited from undergraduate psychology courses and given 
course credit for their participation. All subjects were right-handed 
and reported no known differential hearing loss. All subjects read a 
brief description of the study and completed a consent form prior to 
their participation in the study (see Appendix A). A brief phone inter­
view with each subject was intended to screen individuals who might be 
upset by the nature of the research. The phone contact verified that 
subjects had read and understood the consent form, and were willing to 
cooperate with the demands of the research project.
Attentional Bias Task
Relative hemispheric activation was assessed via an auditory 
attentional bias paradigm (Tucker, Antes, Stenslie & Barnhardt, 1978; 
Tucker, Roth & Shearer, Note 7). This technique is based, first, upon 
Kinsbourne's (1970) observation that there is a contralateral shift in 
attention during relative dominance of one hemisphere, and, second, upon
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the contralateral/ipsalateral input competition in the auditory neural 
system as described above in regard to both dichotic listening (Kimura, 
1966, 1967) and monaural listening (Safer & Leventhal, 1977).
In the present study, the attentional bias task consisted of the 
periodic presentation of a 400 hertz tone of approximately .5 seconds 
duration to both ears of a set of headphones. The auditory signal to 
each side of the headphones was of equal intensity, but in order to min­
imize the effects of possible systematic bias in the audio equipment, 
the headphones were reversed on alternate subjects. The subjects' task 
was to quickly judge in which ear the tone sounded the loudest and 
respond via the buttons mounted in the arms of their chair. Since the 
auditory input to each ear was identical, the subjects' responses should 
reflect either random responding, a response bias, or an attentional 
bias. As in Kinsbourne's (1970) research and the dichotic/monaural 
listening literature, directional bias is presumably indicative of 
contralateral hemispheric dominance, i.e., a left ear bias reflects 
relatively greater right hemisphere activation, whereas a right ear bias 
reflects relatively greater left hemisphere activation.
Prior to the onset of the experiment proper, sample tones were 
administered to insure that the subject understood the instructions. 
Subjects were informally instructed that the tones would be of different 
intensities in each ear, sometimes blatantly different and sometimes 
barely distinguishable, in order to establish the apparent integrity of 
the task. This deception was apparently effective since only a few sub­
jects questioned the veracity of the tone presentations, and these
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skeptics offered only vaguely articulated suspicions about the "real 
purpose" of the tones.
Procedure
Each subject was seated in a comfortable, semi-reclining chair 
in a small, private room. A translucent screen, which allowed projec­
tion of the slides from behind, was placed in front of the subject at a 
distance of about four feet. A projector was housed in an alley adja­
cent to the subject's room such that slides could be projected through a 
partially-draped, one-way mirror onto the screen in front of the subject. 
Having the projector in a separate room diminished projector noise and 
allowed more privacy for subjects during the experiment.
The procedures were discussed informally with each subject in an 
attempt to enlist their cooperation as co-investigators who were helping 
to "create emotions" in the laboratory, rather than as mere subjects of 
scientific scrutiny. The experimenter emphasized that the slides were 
probably not so blatantly arousing that they would automatically induce 
the particular affective state, but that the slides did have enough 
arousal value so that it would be "only natural" to experience some 
arousal. Thus, the subject's creative imagination in "turning on and 
turning off" affective arousal was described informally as the critical 
variable in the research. Subjects were also told that the tone loud­
ness judgement was a "secondary task" in which they should "go with first 
impressions" and not be overly concerned with whether they were right or 
wrong. This was done to reduce evaluative anxiety regarding tone judge­
ments, and to increase the probability that subjects would focus their
30
attention on the concurrent primary task of involving themselves in the 
affect conditions.
Every effort was made to insure subjects' anonymity and to com­
municate this fact to the subjects. Only identifying numbers were used 
on questionnaires, and each subject sealed all of his/her data in an 
envelope prior to leaving the laboratory. Subjects' informal comments 
after the experiment suggested that they had generally felt very free to 
respond affectively during the slide presentations, and free to respond 
frankly on the self-report questionnaires.
The experiment utilized a 2 x 2, within-subjects design (i.e., 
positive vs. negative affect x inhibition vs. facilitation). The four 
treatment conditions were counterbalanced with the exception that the 
two positive affect conditions and the two negative affect conditions 
were paired temporally to provide more continuity for the subject. All 
slide sets were counterbalanced within those conditions. Although con­
siderable informal instruction occurred with each subject, as described 
above, each subject also listened to the following taped instructions 
immediately prior to the onset of each of the four treatment conditions.
Inhibition of Positive (Sexual) Arousal
In just a moment, you will be seeing some color slides on the 
screen in front of you which have been judged by other students to 
be sexually-arousing. Most of us have learned to limit our sexual 
arousal to appropriate times, and it is typically a very private, 
individualized experience. In the next few minutes, as you look at 
these slides, it is only natural that you will experience some sex­
ual thoughts and feelings. We cannot tell what you are thinking, so 
it will be a very private experience. All we ask is that you do 
everything that you can to suppress sexual thoughts and feelings as 
you look at the slides. Exaggerate your usual inhibitions and allow 
them to control the nature of your thinking and feeling so that sex­
ual thoughts and feelings can be blocked out of your experience. 
Please continue to judge the loudness of the tones presented through 
the headphones, as you have done, while you are viewing the slides
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and inhibiting your sexual thoughts and feelings. We will begin in 
just a moment.
Facilitation of Positive (Sexual) Arousal
In just a moment, you will be seeing some color slides on the 
screen in front of you which have been judged by other students to 
be sexually-arousing. Most of us have learned to limit our sexual 
arousal to appropriate times, and it is typically a very private, 
individualized experience. In the next few minutes, however, we 
would like you to set aside your inhibitions and allow yourself to 
experience as much mental and physical sexual arousal as you can 
while viewing these slides. We realize that the slides alone are 
probably not sufficient to make you really aroused. However, if you 
are willing to cooperate, you can use each slide as a stimulus to 
get into your own sexual thoughts and feelings. Feel free to asso­
ciate to your own sexual experiences as you watch these suggestive 
slides. We cannot tell what you are thinking, so it will be a very 
private experience. All we ask is your cooperation in setting aside 
your inhibitions and letting yourself really experience your own 
creative sexual thoughts and feelings while you view the slides. 
Please continue to judge the loudness of the tones presented through 
the headphones, as you have done, while you are viewing the slides 
and allowing yourself to go with your sexual thoughts and feelings. 
We will begin in just a moment.
Inhibition of Negative (Aversive) Arousal
In just a moment, you will be seeing some color slides on the 
screen in front of you which have been judged by other students to 
have some repulsive or frightening content. Most of us have learned 
some automatic coping mechanisms which enable us to limit the effect 
that repulsive or frightening stimuli have on our emotions. In 
other words, we learn how to keep ourselves from becoming overly 
frightened or repulsed when we are in such situations. In the next 
few minutes, as you look at these slides, we would like you to stop 
yourself from experiencing fright, revulsion, or any other negative 
arousal. Although these slides are certainly not so aversive that 
they will overwhelm you, it will be natural for you to experience 
some repulsive or frightened thoughts and feelings. However, we ask 
that you do everything that you can to suppress such arousal as you 
look at the slides. For example, you may use the same coping mech­
anisms you would use if you came upon a car accident and you had to 
control your scared or repulsed feelings in order to aid the vic­
tims. We cannot tell what you are thinking, so it will be a very 
private experience. All we ask is your cooperation in inhibiting or 
suppressing whatever repulsive or frightening thoughts and feelings 
may be aroused while you are viewing these slides. Please continue 
to judge the loudness of the tones presented through the headphones, 
as you have done, while you are viewing the slides and blocking out 
your negative arousal. We will begin in just a moment.
Facilitation of Negative (Aversive) Arousal
In just a moment, you will be seeing some color slides on the 
screen in front of you which have been judged by other students to 
have some repulsive or frightening content. Most of us have learned
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some automatic coping mechanisms which enable us to limit the effect 
that repulsive or frightening stimuli have on our emotions. In 
other words, we learn how to keep ourselves from becoming overly 
frightened or repulsed when we are in such situations. In the next 
few minutes, however, we would like you to set aside your usual ways 
of coping with repulsive or frightening situations as you view these 
slides. We realize that the slides alone are probably not sufficient 
to make you really scared or repulsed. However, if you are willing 
to cooperate, you can use each slide as a stimulus to get into your 
own frightened or repulsed thoughts and feelings. Feel free to 
associate to your own experiences as you watch these suggestive 
slides. We cannot tell what you are thinking, so it will be a very 
private experience. All we ask is your cooperation in setting aside 
your usual inhibitions and coping mechanisms, and letting yourself 
really experience your own scared or repulsed thoughts and feelings 
while you view these slides. Please continue to judge the loudness 
of the tones presented through the headphones, as you have done, 
while you are viewing the slides and allowing yourself to go with 
your repulsed or scared thoughts and feelings. We will begin in 
just a moment.
Inspection of the preceding passages will verify that instructions as to 
how subjects were expected to achieve the suggested affective state were 
intentionally vague. Instructions which might imply the use of either 
verbal or imaginal mediation strategies were purposely avoided since, 
from what is known about differential processing in the cerebral hemi­
spheres, this would plausibly result in unnecessary biasing of the data. 
In other words, inhibitive or facilitative processes, or even negative 
or positive affective states could differentially involve verbal or 
imaginal mediation strategies.
Seven slides were presented during each condition for a duration 
of 45 seconds each, with tone presentations occurring at the 5, 20 and 
35 second points during each slide presentation. Thus, a total of 21 
tone loudness judgements were required in each of the four treatment 
conditions. The subjects' responses were recorded by an experimenter 
who monitored response indicator lights in the alley which were con­
nected to the buttons on the arms of the chair.
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Other Measures
Following each of the four treatment conditions, subjects were 
given questionnaires which requested ratings on a five point scale of 
success in approximating the affective state suggested in the instruc­
tions, degree of psychological arousal experienced, and degree of physi­
cal arousal experienced (i.e., 1— not at all to 5— very much). Subjects 
were also asked to write a brief description of the nature of the inhib- 
itive tactics they had employed or of the nature of the affective 
arousal they experienced, in the inhibition and facilitation conditions 
respectively (see Appendix A). The time spent in completing the ques­
tionnaires was also intended to minimize affective "carry over" across 
conditions.
Each subject completed the Trait Anxiety Inventory (TAI) (Spiel- 
berger, Gorsuch & Lushene, 1970), and the Forced-Choice Sex Guilt Inven­
tory (SGI) (Mosher, Note 14). The TAI was included because of the 
apparent relevance of trait anxiety to differential hemispheric function­
ing (Tucker et al., 1978), and to approximate an indicator of general 
affective arousal. The SGI was included to approximate an indicator of 
general inhibitive functioning, as well as to distinguish which students, 
if any, for whom sexual arousal was clearly not "positive" arousal. 
Assuming that the TAI and SGI are indeed indicative of general affective 
arousal and inhibitive functioning respectively, they should be useful 
predictors of differential hemispheric activation during conditions of
arousal and inhibition of arousal.
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Two trials of the Stroop Color-Word Test (SCWT) (Stroop, 1935) 
were administered before and after the experiment via the 45-second, 
total number read method of administration. Only the second trial was 
used in the analyses because of the reported practice effect on this 
measure (Jensen, 1965). The raw SCWT data were converted into inter­
ference scores (C and CW difference score) and conceptual vs. perceptual 
dominance scores (W and C ratio) (see review by Jensen & Rohwer, 1966). 
Low-interference individuals have been characterized as flexible, tend­
ing not to suppress feeling and other internal cues, and exhibiting a 
greater proportion of primary process thought, most of which is more 
blatant, drive-related primary process thinking rather than the toned- 
down, derivative variety; high-interference individuals have been char­
acterized as constricted, tending toward counteractive measures to over­
come intrusive cues, and manifesting more overt tension and apparent 
discomfort in dealing with primary process thought (Gardner, Holzman, 
Klein, Linton & Spence, 1959; Holt, 1960). Thus, it seemed plausible 
that SCWT interference scores, either separately or in combination with 
conceptual vs. perceptual dominance scores, may serve as effective pre­
dictors of hemispheric functioning, i.e., attentional bias, during the
treatment conditions.
CHAPTER III
RESULTS
Psychological Arousal and Physical 
Arousal across Treatment 
Conditions
Means of subjects' ratings of their psychological arousal and 
physical arousal across the four conditions were compared in order to 
assure that the various treatment conditions actually did produce dif­
ferential affective responding. Self-rated arousal was thus compared 
between the inhibition and facilitation conditions for both positive and 
negative affective arousal via J: tests.
Self-rated psychological arousal in the positive affect- 
inhibition condition was significantly lower than such arousal in the 
positive affect-facilitation condition, jt(47) = 6.27, jo < .001. Self- 
rated physical arousal in the positive affect-inhibition condition was 
significantly lower than such arousal in the positive affect-facilitation 
condition, jt(47) = 8.17, £  < .001.
Self-rated psychological arousal in the negative affect- 
inhibition condition was significantly lower than such arousal in the 
negative affect-facilitation condition, Jt(47) = 3.92, £ < .001. Self- 
rated physical arousal in the negative affect-inhibition condition was 
significantly lower than such arousal in the negative affect-facilitation 
condition, t_(47) = 4.32, < .001. Thus it is apparently a safe
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assumption that subjects were, in fact, responding differentially across 
the four affect conditions, or at least reporting differentially.
Attentional Bias Difference 
Score Means
The attentional bias tone judgement data for each subject were 
converted into different scores, i.e., left minus right. Thus, nega­
tive difference scores presumably reflect relatively greater left hemi­
sphere activation, whereas positive difference scores presumably reflect 
relatively greater right hemisphere activation. Disregarding subject 
variables, the mean difference scores for the four treatment conditions 
were as follows: positive affect-inhibition, M = -2.58; positive 
affect-facilitation, M = -4.00; negative affect-inhibition, M = -4.83; 
negative affect-facilitation, M = -3.62. A Hotelling's T* test revealed 
no significant differences among the means, T* = .071, _F(3, 45) = .02,
> .5, and no significant deviation from zero, T^ = .232, _F(4, 44) = 
.05, p >.5. Thus, the attentional bias data suggest a slight, nonsig­
nificant right bias, i.e., left hemispheric predominance, across all 
treatment conditions. However, it should be noted that there were 
marked individual differences in attentional bias which were not 
directly attributable to the treatment conditions. For example, some 
subjects made almost all "left" responses, and some subjects made 
almost all "right" responses, regardless of treatment condition and 
regardless of which channel was presented to which ear.
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Prediction of Attentional Bias 
Using Subject Variables
Since considerable individual variation was evident in the 
attentional bias data, and since the entire study was based upon sub­
jects' ability to recreate affective states in the laboratory, examina­
tions of subject involvement variables in relation to attentional bias 
were the crucial analyses. Utilizing a multiple regression approach 
(Kerlinger & Pedhazur, 1973), the following self-rated subject variables 
were utilized to predict subjects' difference scores on the attentional 
bias task in each condition: (a) success in approximating the suggested 
affective state; (b) success in approximating the affective state oppo­
site to the state suggested; (c) psychological arousal during the sug­
gested affective state; (d) physical arousal during the suggested affec­
tive state. In other words, for example, attentional bias difference 
scores in the positive-inhibition condition were predicted using the 
subjects' ratings of success in inhibiting sexual arousal in the 
positive-inhibition condition, success in facilitating sexual arousal in 
the positive affect-facilitation condition, degree of psychological sex­
ual arousal experienced in the positive affect-inhibition condition, and 
degree of physical sexual arousal experienced in the positive affect- 
inhibition condition. Prediction of attentional bias difference scores 
in the other three treatment conditions proceeded in a parallel manner. 
The summary tables for the multiple regression predictions of atten­
tional bias using such predictors in each of the four treatment condi­
tions are presented in Tables 1 - 4 .
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Multiple Regression: Positive-Inhibition Attentional 
Bias X Subjects' Self-Ratings
Table 1
Source beta SS df F £
Pos.-Facil. Success + .027 3.0 1 .03 >.5
Pos.-Inhib. Success -.112 27.5 1 .27 >.5
Psychological Arousal -.060 8.2 1 .08 >.5
Physical Arousal -.210 128.1 1 1.27 .27
Total Regression 171.8 4 .42 >.5
Within 4403.9 43
TOTAL 4575.7 47
Table 2
Multiple Regression: Positive-Facilitation Attentional 
Bias X Subjects' Self-Ratings
Source beta SS df F £
Pos.-Inhib. Success -.013 .5 1 .007 >.5
Pos.-Facil. Success +.210 91.8 1 .83 .36
Psychological Arousal +.014 .2 1 .003 >.5
Physical Arousal -.178 101.0 1 .89 .35
Total Regression 211.9 4 .47 >.5
Within 4890.1 43
TOTAL 5102.0 47
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Table 3
Multiple Regression: Negative-Inhibition Attentional 
Bias X Subjects' Self-Ratings
Source beta SS df F £
Neg.-Facil. Success + .201 184.2 1 1.50 .23
Neg.-Inhib. Success -.043 5.6 1 .06 >.5
Psychological Arousal -.160 78.1 1 .65 .42
Physical Arousal + .124 55.8 1 .47 >.5
Total Regression 269.0 4 .54 >.5
Within 5311.6 43
TOTAL 5580.7 47
Table 4
Multiple Regression: Negative--Facilitation
Attentional Bias X Subjects' Self-Ratings
Source beta SS df F £
Neg.-Inhib. Success -.273 302.8 1 3.73 .06
Neg.-Facil. Success +. 364 214.9 1 2.64 .11
Psychological Arousal -.051 4.9 1 .06 >.5
Physical Arousal -.335 454.1 1 5.62 .02
Total Regression 1372.6 4 4.20 .006
Within 3510.6 43
TOTAL 4883.2 47
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As shown in Tables 1 - 4 ,  subjects' ratings of their subjective 
state were not effective predictors of attentional bias except in the 
negative affect-facilitation condition. Utilizing the four subject vari­
ables described above, a significant proportion of the variance (28.1%) 
of attentional bias difference scores could be predicted, F.(4, 43) = 4.20, 
£  = .006. As noted above, there was a slight right bias across all con­
ditions; thus, prediction of attentional bias in the negative affect- 
facilitation condition is directed toward relative left-right differ­
ences rather than specific left bias or right bias per se. Examination 
of the directional status of the beta weights indicates that less suc­
cess in inhibiting aversive arousal in the negative affect-inhibition 
condition, greater success in facilitating aversive arousal in the nega­
tive affect-facilitation condition, and less physical arousal in the 
negative affect-facilitation condition, are predictive of relatively 
greater left attentional bias, i.e., relatively greater right hemisphere 
activation, during facilitation of aversive arousal.
As mentioned above, it was also hypothesized that subjects'
Trait Anxiety Inventory scores, Sex-Guilt Inventory scores, and Stroop 
Color-Word Test interference scores and conceptual vs. perceptual domi­
nance scores would predict subjects' attentional bias in the various 
treatment conditions. Multiple regression analyses using these four 
variables as predictors of attentional bias difference scores indicated 
no support for these hypotheses (see Appendix B).
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Selected Correlational Results
Although Trait Anxiety Inventory (TAI) scores and Sex-Guilt 
Inventory (SGI) scores were not effective predictors of attentional 
bias, they were clearly related to many of the subjects' ratings of sub­
jective states during the various affect conditions. As shown in Table 
5, higher trait anxiety was associated with less success in inhibiting 
arousal, and with greater affective arousal despite instructions to 
inhibit such arousal. As shown in Table 6, higher SGI scores were asso­
ciated with less success in facilitating sexual arousal and less success 
in inhibiting aversive arousal.
Table 5
Correlations between Trait Anxiety Inventory 
Scores and Subjects' Self-Ratings
Rating r 2
Pos.-Inhib. Success -.14 .17
Pos.-Inhib. Psychological Arousal +.17 .12
Pos.-Inhib. Physical Arousal +.33 .01
Neg.-Inhib. Success -.24 .05
Neg.-Inhib. Psychological Arousal + .30 .02
Neg.-Inhib. Physical Arousal +.26 .04
Pos.-Facil. Success -.11 .23
Pos.-Facil. Psychological Arousal -.06 .35
Pos.-Facil. Physical Arousal + . 18 .11
Neg.-Facil. Success -.12 .21
Neg.-Facil. Psychological Arousal -.20 .08
Neg.-Facil. Physical Arousal + .16 .15
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Table 6
Correlations between Sex-Guilt Inventory 
Scores and Subjects' Self-Ratings
Rating r R
Pos.-Inhib. Success +.10 .25
Pos.-Inhib. Psychological Arousal -.05 .36
Pos.-Inhib. Physical Arousal -.03 .42
Neg.-Inhib. Success -.16 .14
Neg.-Inhib. Psychological Arousal +.26 .04
Neg.-Inhib. Physical Arousal +.16 .14
Pos.-Facil. Success -.38 .004
Pos.-Facil. Psychological Arousal -.23 .05
Pos.-Facil. Physical Arousal -.18 .11
Neg.-Facil. Success + .20 .09
Neg.-Facil. Psychological Arousal + .21 .08
Neg.-Facil. Physical Arousal -.09 .27
Categorization of Subjects' Descriptions 
of Subjective States
Immediately following each affect condition, subjects were asked 
to write a brief description of the nature of the arousal which they 
experienced in the two facilitation conditions, and the nature of the 
inhibition strategies which they employed in the two inhibition condi­
tions. Examination of these subjective reports regarding thought pro­
cesses across conditions suggested that differential cognitive 
approaches were employed across the inhibition and facilitation condi­
tions. As illustrated by the selected, representative comments
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presented below, descriptions of arousal in the facilitation conditions 
suggest that subjects tended toward imaginal/global cognition:
Positive Affect
Females: could picture the sexual act briefly; muscle contrac­
tions in vaginal area; I imagined my man and me doing that stuff; 
made me dream about men in my future and some in my past; mental 
remembering of sexual experiences; I kept seeing and thinking about 
intimate times with my mate; heart beating faster; breathing deeper; 
it felt like I was being physically stimulated and I imagined I was.
Males: fantasizing being there and doing what they're doing—
put myself in the picture; mostly sexual fantasy, slight genital 
tingling, increased heart rate, etc.; slight erection, mentally sim­
ulating tactual sensations; mental images of past experiences and 
fantasies; could very vividly picture myself engaging in sexual 
activity with the women.
Negative Affect
Females: I kept seeing myself there and it scared me; sick to
my stomach, felt like crying; could feel the snakes crawling all 
over me— yuk!; some slides made me shudder mostly if I thought of 
those things happening to me or someone close; felt kind of sick 
feeling in my gut; felt angry and guilty; put myself in their situa­
tion and experienced pain myself as if I was actually there; felt 
anger toward those who caused cuts, burns, starvation, etc.; felt 
like gagging; I was scared— I felt snakes crawling on me— they were 
gruesome.
Males: I fantasized that the bat was clutching my chest and
chewing on my face; I could feel and smell the colostomy; envisioned 
the snakes crawling all over my arm; imagined that I was put into a 
closed environment with the subject; associated the worst possible 
image; could feel my heartbeat, was sweating some.
In contrast, self-reports about inhibition strategies which were 
employed suggest that subjects tended toward verbal/analytic cognitive 
processing, as illustrated by the selected, representative comments pre­
sented below:
Positive Affect
Females: I picked objects to focus on; assumed scientific, ana­
tomical viewpoint; by counting other objects in the pictures; told 
myself that they had clothes on; planned things I have to get done 
today; by telling myself "he's taken" or "he wouldn't care for me"; 
told myself I wasn't part of it; I saw the whole picture and then 
concentrated on the faces; kept telling myself it was an awful act.
Males: by telling myself I wasn't interested; by concentrating
on another subject; by picking out faults or negative aspects of
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people in the pictures; thought of unpleasant sexual situations; 
picked out parts of the slides that were not arousing and concen­
trated on them; concentrated on the buzz sound and shut the slides 
off in my mind.
Negative Affect
Females: assumed a scientific point of view; picked out the 
positive aspects of each slide; asked myself what I could do to help; 
tried to figure out the causes of the wounds and how to treat them;
I said they can't hurt you— they're just pictures; worked on 
rationalizing what I saw or explaining to myself; tried to analyze 
the physical disorder; kept telling myself "it's natural'; kept 
telling myself these things were fake; thought of an appropriate 
reason for the slide; snakes bothered me the worst, so I tried 
counting them; by thinking it will never happen to me.
Males: by explaining to myself that I was removed from the
place; by explaining each in known terms; tried to reason what could 
be done; tried to think of an alternative to the situation; would 
contemplate the social problems connected to the situation; I told 
myself that I have seen many things a lot worse; I asked myself 
"Okay, what needs to be done here to help this person? Things 
aren't as bad as they look— let's get him to a hospital— he'll be 
okay."
Such apparent use of differential cognitive strategies across 
the inhibition vs. facilitation dimension was certainly not an all- 
inclusive phenomenon, and there were some interesting exceptions. For 
example, in the positive affect-inhibition condition, one student 
responded with, "thought of how they would look with a bucket of ice 
cold water thrown over them," and in the negative affect-inhibition con­
dition, one subject responded with, "put the slide in my mind as an 
inanimate object— a person as a tree, animal as a rock, etc."
These observations prompted an attempt to quantify this apparent 
relationship. Subjects' descriptions of their arousal and inhibition 
strategies were categorized by the experimenter as to whether they 
involved predominantly verbal/analytic or predominantly imaginal/global 
processing.  ^ Such categorization was accomplished by scanning subjects'
3This was done in a non-blind manner due to the nature of the 
questions (see Appendix A).
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immediate, retrospective reports for key words, phrases, and themes 
thought to reflect ongoing cognitive activity during the treatment con­
ditions. Relative verbal/analytic predominance was assumed when sub­
jects reported internal verbal dialogue, reasoning, rationalizations, 
and/or focused, concentrated, analytic perception of the slides, in the 
absence of imaginal/global content. Relative imaginal/global predomi­
nance was assumed when subjects reported imagery, fantasies, and/or 
global, diffuse perception of the slides, in the absence of verbal/ 
analytic content. With four ratings from each of the 48 subjects, 192 
responses were examined, 94 (49%) of which were categorizable as "left" 
or "right." Responses which did not report categorizable experience 
according to the criteria above, and those which reported both verbal/ 
analytic and imaginal/global content in the same report, were left uncat­
egorized and omitted from further analyses. The categorized, nominal 
data were collapsed across the positive/negative dimension and analyzed 
via a McNemar Test of Change for related samples. In order to use this 
statistical technique, only those subjects who were classifiable on both 
the inhibition and the facilitation category could be considered. The 
data from the McNemar Test of Change for related samples is presented in 
Table 7. For this subset of subjects, such a categorization of verbal/
analytic and imaginal/global processing on the inhibition/facilitation
2dimension was significant, x (1) = 14.06, jd = .0002. Thus, subjects who 
reported experience classifiable as verbal/analytic in the inhibition 
condition reported experience classifiable as imaginal/global in the 
facilitation condition, and vice versa.
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McNemar Test of Change: Classifiable Reports 
of Arousal and Inhibition Strategies
Table 7
Facilitation 
Verbal/ Imaginal/
Analytic Global Unclassified Total
Imaginal/Global 0 4 7 11
Inhibition
Verbal/Analytic 3 16 31 50
Unclassified 0 10
Total 3 30 94
X2(l) = 14.06, £  = .0002
In order to ascertain whether subjects were favoring such dif­
ferential cognitive processing within the positive and negative affect 
conditions, separate McNemar Test of Change Statistics were computed.
As presented in Tables 8 and 9, the verbal/analytic versus imaginal/ 
global processing categorization was significant for the positive affect 
conditions, (x2(l) = 9.09, £ = .0026), and approached significance for 
the negative affect conditions, (x2(l) = 3.2, £ = .074). In other words, 
during both positive and negative affect, subjects who reported verbal/ 
analytic processing during the inhibition of arousal tended to report 
imaginal/global processing during the facilitation of arousal. However, 
subjects' reports were not corroborated by their attentional bias dif­
ference scores (see Appendix B).
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McNemar Test of Change: Classifiable Reports 
of Arousal and Inhibition Strategies 
During Positive Affect
Table 8
Facilitation
Verbal/ Imaginal/
Analytic Global Unclassified Total
Imaginal/Global 0 3 4 7
Inhibition
Verbal/Analytic 0 11 10 21
Unclassified 0 8
Total 0 22 50
X2(l) = 9.09, £ = .0026
Table 9
McNemar Test of Change: Classifiable Reports 
of Arousal and Inhibition Strategies 
During Negative Affect
Facilitation
Verbal/ Imaginal/
Analytic Global Unclassified Total
Imaginal/Global 0 1 3 4
Inhibition
Verbal/Analytic 3 5 21 29
Unclassified 0 2
Total 3 8 44
X2(1) = 3.2, £ = .074
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Other Results
Descriptive data, intercorrelations among variables, and 
analyses of sex differences for all variables are presented in
Appendix B.
CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSION
In summary of the results, differential hemispheric activation, 
as evidenced by mean attentional bias across conditions, was not observed 
for the grouped data: a slight right bias was evident across conditions. 
Prediction of attentional bias using subject involvement variables sug­
gested that both success in generating aversive arousal and lack of suc­
cess in inhibiting aversive arousal in response to the slides were 
accompanied by relatively greater right hemisphere activation. However, 
greater right hemisphere activation was characterized by less physical 
arousal, thus emphasizing the heterogeneous nature of aversive arousal. 
The most salient finding was provided by categorical analyses of sub­
jects' descriptions of their subjective experience across conditions. 
Under instructions to facilitate arousal, subjects' reports of their 
subjective experience were generally characterized by imaginal/global 
thought. Conversely, under instructions to inhibit arousal, subjects' 
reports of their subjective experience were generally characterized by 
verbal/analytic thought. However, subjects' reports of differential 
cognitive strategies across the facilitation/inhibition dimension were 
not corroborated by their attentional bias scores across conditions.
The interactional theories of Bakan (Note 5), Galin (1974,
1977), and Tucker (Note 12) would predict that the right hemisphere
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would be relatively more active during the facilitation of emotional 
arousal, whereas the left hemisphere would be relatively more active 
during the inhibition of emotional arousal. In the present study, sub­
jective experiences of subjects under instructions to facilitate emo­
tional arousal were generally characterized by images, fantasies, and 
global perception of the slides, in the absence of internal verbal dia­
logue or analytic thinking. Under instructions to inhibit arousal, sub­
jects' reported experiences were largely characterized by internal 
verbal dialogue, rationalizations, and analytic perception of the slides, 
in the absence of imagery. As mentioned previously, other research sug­
gests that verbal processing involves relatively greater left hemisphere 
usage (e.g., Schwartz, Davidson & Maer, 1975), while imagery involves 
relatively greater right hemisphere usage (e.g., Morgan, McDonald & 
McDonald, 1971). Furthermore, it seems that the left hemisphere tends 
toward analytic processing while the right hemisphere tends toward pro­
cessing wholes in a global manner (Bogen & Bogen, 1969; Levy, 1969;
Nebes, 1974). Thus, the present study's categorizations of subjects' 
self-reports suggest that the inhibition of affective arousal may be 
mediated primarily by left hemisphere processing, while the facilitation 
of affective arousal may be mediated primarily by right hemisphere pro­
cessing, across both positive and negative affect.
The subjects' self-reports were not corroborated by the atten- 
tional bias assessment; no significant differences were obtained among 
the mean attentional bias difference scores across the various condi­
tions, either for the grouped data as a whole or for those subjects 
whose reported cognitive strategies were classifiable. In addition to
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obvious limitations of indirect measurement of brain activity, it 
appears that the very nature of the attentional bias task may have 
biased responding. Although the tone judgements were presented as a 
"secondary task," many subjects informally reported that the tone pre­
sentations had required very focused, analytic attention. Thus, the 
obtained right bias across conditions could plausibly reflect the rela­
tively greater left hemisphere activation which may have been required 
by the inherent nature of the attentional bias task, or alternatively, a 
right hand response bias. However, a few subjects informally reported 
an impressionistic scanning strategy aimed at localization of the com­
bined tone on either side of the midline; such a strategy could plau­
sibly involve relatively greater right hemisphere activation, in con­
trast to a focused, analytic approach to tone loudness judgement. Thus, 
although it appears that the attentional bias task may necessarily pro­
duce a slight right bias for grouped data, it seems that individual dif­
ferences in approaching the task may be an important variable. In con­
trast to measures of hemispheric activation which assess a passive sub­
ject (e.g., EEG), assessment of attentional bias in the present frame­
work requires an actively responding subject. This requirement of atten 
tional bias assessment is likely to interfere with obtaining an index of 
relative hemispheric activation which is independent from individual 
differences in cognitive approach or response bias which may interact 
with the nature of the task. The apparent difficulty in the use of the 
attentional bias paradigm is difficult to reconcile with its apparent 
successful use in previous research (Tucker, Antes, Stenslie & Barnhardt
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1978; Tucker, Roth & Shearer, Note 7). However, it appears that further 
basic research on this indirect measure is necessary prior to continued 
applied usage.
It is puzzling that attentional bias could be significantly pre­
dicted using subject involvement variables during the facilitation of 
aversive arousal, but not during the other affect conditions. Subjects' 
ratings of their affective involvement did not vary significantly across 
the positive/negative dimension, yet parallel prediction of attentional 
bias during the facilitation of sexual arousal was not evident. This 
result appears to corroborate the Dimond et al. (1976) suggestion that 
the right hemisphere is characterized by horrific affect, yet does not 
support EEG findings that the right hemisphere is significantly more 
active during sexual arousal (Cohen, Rosen & Goldstein, 1976; Goldstein, 
Sugerman, Marjerrison & Stoltzfus, Note 13).
Although ratings of subjects' reported success in inhibiting 
aversive arousal were an important component in the prediction of atten­
tional bias during aversive arousal, no direct support for greater left 
hemisphere activation during inhibition of affective arousal was 
obtained in the attentional bias data. Although a left/right and 
inhibition/facilitation interaction was not evident, the results did not 
support earlier EEG findings that suggest that the left hemisphere is 
characterized by negative affect (Harman & Ray, 1977; Ehrlichman & 
Wiener, Notes 10, 11), while the right hemisphere is characterized by 
positive affect (Ehrlichman & Wiener, Notes 10, 11). In the present 
study, aversive affective arousal was accompanied by relatively greater 
left attentional bias, presumably reflecting relatively greater right
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hemispheric activation during negative affect. Considering that less 
success in inhibiting aversive arousal and greater success in facili­
tating aversive arousal were related to relatively greater right hemi­
sphere activation, it is somewhat surprising that less physical arousal 
was apparently related to less left and more right hemisphere involve­
ment. Subjects who noted their physical arousal generally reported 
bodily processes characteristic of the activity of the sympathetic ner­
vous system, i.e., increased heart rate, increased depth of respiration, 
excess perspiration, etc. Bakan (Note 5) has suggested that the sympa­
thetic division of the autonomic nervous system is part of the left 
hemisphere system and that the parasympathetic division is part of the 
right hemisphere system. Thus, this apparently contradictory result may 
support Bakan's contention that the sympathetic and parasympathetic 
divisions are differentially related to the two cerebral hemisphere sys­
tems. More specifically, this result suggests that sympathetic arousal 
may be accompanied by greater left hemisphere activation, and that psy­
chological arousal and physical arousal may be orthogonal in their rela­
tionship to hemispheric functioning.
It is interesting to note that reported degree of psychological 
arousal is not an effective predictor of attentional bias, although suc­
cess in approximating aversive arousal and reported physical aversive 
arousal are effective predictors. However, self-ratings of aversive 
psychological arousal were positively correlated with relatively greater 
left bias, i.e., right hemispheric activation (_r = +.20, £  = .08). This 
suggests that the ratings of psychological arousal did not account for 
any unique variance in attentional bias which was not accounted for by
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the other variables. It is important to note the contrast between the 
"main effect" component predictions and the overall, multiple prediction 
of attentional bias during aversive arousal, as presented in Table 4. 
Whereas the physical arousal rating accounts for a significant propor­
tion of the variance (g = .02), the ratings of success under inhibition 
and facilitation instructions merely reflect trends. However, when the 
variables are combined in a multiple regression equation, the resulting 
prediction is highly significant, (g = .006). This suggests that there 
was considerable overlap among the predictor variables and that knowl­
edge of multiple facets of affective responding are necessary for effec­
tive prediction of relative hemispheric activation.
A possible attenuating or distorting factor in the present study 
should be mentioned. Individuals participating in this study were asked 
to create affective states using relatively mild slides as facilitating 
stimuli. It is plausible that such fabricated arousal is both quanti­
tatively and qualitatively different than spontaneous affective arousal. 
However, the paradoxical nature of instructions to "Be spontaneous!" 
makes realistic study of affective arousal in the laboratory a difficult 
task when deception is not employed. The use of more potent visual/ 
auditory stimuli, such as sexual demonstration films and films regarding 
highway safety or primitive tribal rites, with willing subjects, would 
perhaps allow more realistic investigation of "positive" and "negative" 
affective arousal without such reliance upon subjects' abilities to 
involve themselves.
The correlational results obtained in the present study suggest 
that the Trait Anxiety Inventory and the Sex-Guilt Inventory are
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relevant indices of individual differences in aversive and sexual affec­
tive responding. Considering the methodological difficulties of the 
attentional bias task mentioned above, the fact that these measures did 
not effectively predict attentional bias should not declare them irrele­
vant. Correlations between subjects' ratings of their involvement in 
the suggested affective conditions and their TAI and SGI scores suggest 
that such individual difference measures could plausibly be effective 
predictors of relative hemispheric activation assessed in a more viable 
manner.
Despite the somewhat inconsistent nature of the data, and the 
methodological problems already mentioned, the present study offers some 
tentative empirical direction to speculation about the cerebral hemi­
spheres' contributions to emotionality. The results, taken as a whole, 
suggest that traditional views of the "rationality" of the left hemi­
sphere and the "emotionality" of the right hemisphere, or more recent 
dichotomizations of the hemispheres as affectively "positive" or "nega­
tive" (e.g., Ehrlichman & Wiener, Notes 10, 11; Harman & Ray, 1977) may 
overlook a significant functional interaction of the hemispheres in emo­
tionality (Galin, 1974, 1977; Bakan, Note 5; Tucker, Note 12). In other 
words, it appears that subjectively experienced emotions may be a com­
posite of the primitive, subcortical arousal of the limbic system, 
coupled with the spontaneous, often imaginal emotional tone of the right 
hemisphere, and the controlling, inhibiting, often verbal emotional tone 
of the left hemisphere. Within such a conceptualization, a given hemi­
sphere would be neither inherently "emotional" or "rational," or
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inherently "positive" or "negative;" the valence of experienced emotion 
would be determined by the interaction itself.
The intriguing possibility that the cerebral hemispheres may be 
differentially employed during affective arousal and during inhibition 
of arousal seems to parallel recent preliminary research on relative 
hemispheric activation in psychopathology. Tentative data suggest that 
the left hemisphere may be relatively more active in depression (Tucker, 
Roth & Shearer, Note 7) and obsessive-compulsive neurotic styles 
(Shevrin & Smokier, Note 15), while the right hemisphere may be rela­
tively more active in hysteric neurotic styles (Shevrin & Smokier, Note 
15). Clinically, depressives and obsessive-compulsives typically mani­
fest a constricted, inhibited, ruminative cognitive style, whereas hys­
terics typically present as unconstrained, impressionistic, and diffuse 
individuals. Perhaps these various forms of psychopathology may reflect 
exaggeration of the functioning of a given hemisphere system. More gen­
erally, perhaps psychopathology often involves overreliance upon a given 
hemispheric system, with the relative preclusion of the other hemisphere 
system, although this does not imply a cause and effect relationship. 
Bogen and Bogen (1969) have suggested that optimal integration of the 
hemispheres may be a prerequisite to creativity. Similarly, perhaps, 
integration of hemispheric functioning may be a prerequisite to "exis­
tential creativity," i.e., effective, adaptive coping with life's prob­
lems. Thus, perhaps psychotherapy focused away from usual cognitive 
style modalities may often prove to be more effective, as if this some­
how balances differential hemispheric functioning. Tucker, Shearer & 
Murray (1977) have reported tentative supportive data for such
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speculation: individuals who were characterized by relatively greater
right hemisphere usage tended toward greater reduction in self-reported 
and behavioral anxiety when they had participated in a primarily verbal 
cognitive-behavioral treatment, whereas individuals characterized by 
relatively greater left hemisphere usage tended to improve more if they 
participated in treatment focused primarily upon imagery.
Although such speculation is interesting, and may eventually 
prove to be useful, the simple hemispheric dichotomization of emotion­
ality, even across the facilitation/inhibition dimension, is not possi­
ble from the present study, and may well be ultimately impossible. The 
present data do suggest that the cerebral component of emotionality may 
involve hemispheric interaction based upon the relative facilitative or 
inhibitory functioning of the right and left hemispheres, respectively. 
However, understanding of affective arousal, inhibition of arousal, and 
perhaps some forms of psychopathology, must necessarily focus upon the 
more general interaction of the cerebral component, including psycho­
dynamic factors, with autonomic functions and subcortical systems. 
Pending further research, the present study offers tentative insight 
into the nature of the cognitive component of emotionality.
APPENDIX A
CONSENT FORM AND ASSESSMENT MATERIALS
Consent Form for Experiment No. 18 
Description of the Study
This research project is a study of negative and positive emotions. 
It is difficult for us to study students in actual emotional situations; 
thus, we are requesting your cooperation in recreating positive and nega­
tive emotions in our laboratory. We will be asking you to view color 
pictures which have either sexual content (positive emotion) or fright­
ening or repulsive content (negative emotion). You will be asked to 
either let yourself fully experience emotional thoughts and feelings or 
to keep yourself from experiencing emotional thoughts and feelings while 
you view the pictures. We cannot tell what you are thinking or feeling, 
so it will be a very private experience. You will be in a room by your­
self while you are viewing the pictures. You will be asked to complete 
some questionnaires regarding your experience, but a number, rather than 
your name will be used to identify the forms. All of the persons who 
will be assisting in this project have agreed to maintain the privacy 
and confidentiality of your experience. Again, remember that we are 
depending upon your cooperation and abilities to assist us in studying 
these emotions.
If you have any qualms or misgivings about participating because of 
the nature of the research, please do not participate. If you do choose 
to participate, completion will require 1 1 / 2 - 2 hours, and you will 
receive the appropriate amount of course credit. We will be happy to 
share our findings with you after completion of the research project.
Informed Consent
I understand the nature of the research as described above and 
agree to participate. If I wish to discontinue participation in the 
experiment at any time, I may do so and still receive course credit.
Date Signature
Telephone No. Address
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TALLY SHEET
Do circled condition first. Headphone cord oni L R
Subject Number! _____ Positive: Slide Set - 1 2
Sexi M F Negative: Slide Set - 1 2
Positive Affect 
(Sexual arousal)
Negative Affect 
(Aversive Arousal)
Inhib/Faeil Inhib/Facil Inhib/Facil Inhib/Faeil
1. L R L R L R L R
2. L R L R L R L R
3. L R L R L R L R
9. L R L R L R L R
5. L R L R L R L R
6. L R L R L R L R
7. L R L R L R L R
8. L R L R L R L R
9. L K L R L R L R
10. L R L R L R L R
11. L R L R L R L R
12. L R L R L R L R
13. L R L R 1 R L R
19. L R L R L R L R
15. L R L R L R L R
16. L R L R L R L R
17. L R L R L R L R
18. L R L R L R L R
19. L R L R L R L R
20. L R L R L R L R
21. L R L R L R L R
Record Stroop scores here: 1.) words____ I colors_____ j color/words
2.) words____ : colors_____ i color/words
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PERSONAL REACTIONS QUESTIONNAIRE
(Negative - Facilitate)
1) To what degree were you able to let yourself experience frightening 
or revolting thoughts and feelings as you watched the slides? 
(Please circle appropriate number.)
1 ------------2
Not 
at all
Very
Much
2) How much frightening or revolting arousal were you experiencing 
during most of the slides?
1  -  • 
Not 
at all
Mental or Psychological Arousal
2
Very
Much
Physical Arousal
1 -------- 2 ----------3 ----------4 ----------5
Not Very
at all Much
3) Please describe briefly the nature of the arousal which you
experienced.
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PERSONAL REACTIONS QUESTIONNAIRE
(Negative - Inhibit)
1) To what degree were you able to stop yourself from experiencing 
frightening or revolting thoughts and feelings as you watched the 
slides? (Please circle appropriate number.)
1 -------- 2 ----------3 ----------4 ----------5
Not Very
at all Much
2) How much frightening or revolting arousal were you experiencing 
during most of the slides?
Mental or Psychological Arousal
1  -  • 
Not 
at all
1  -  ■ 
Not 
at all
Very
Much
2
Physical Arousal 
• - 3 -------- 4 ■ 5
Very
Much
3) Please describe briefly how you tried to keep yourself from 
becoming mentally or physically aroused.
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PERSONAL REACTIONS QUESTIONNAIRE
(Positive - Inhibit)
1) To what degree were you able to stop yourself from experiencing
sexually-arousing thoughts and feelings as you watched the slides? 
(Please circle appropriate number.)
1 ---- ■ - - 2 -------- 3 - 5
Not Very
at all Much
2) How much sexual arousal were you experiencing during most of the
slides?
Mental or Psychological Arousal
1 - - - 1 -------- 4 -------- - 5
Not Very
at all Much
Physical Arousal
1 - - - - 5
Not Very
at all Much
3) Please describe briefly how you tried to keep yourself from 
becoming mentally or physically aroused.
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PERSONAL REACTIONS QUESTIONNAIRE
(Positive - Facilitate)
1) To what degree were you able to let yourself experience sexual 
thoughts and feelings as you watched the slides? (Please circle 
appropriate number.)
1 -------- 2 ----------3 ----------4 ----------5
Not Very
at all Much
2) How much sexual arousal were you experiencing during most of the 
slides?
1 -
Not 
at all
1 - ■ 
Not 
at all
Mental or Psychological Arousal
2 -------- 3 ----------4 ----------5
Very
Much
Physical Arousal
2 -------- 3 ----------4 ----------5
Very
Much
3) Please describe briefly the nature of the arousal which you
experienced.
APPENDIX B
ADDITIONAL DATA
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TABLE 10
Descriptive Data For 
All Variables
VAUIAdLF MEAN
DFPI 18.4167
O F PF 17.0000OFNI 16.1667OF NF 17.375 0THAI 39.5000PIOG 4.0208
PIPS 2.2917PI PH 1.6458PFDG 3.5625PFPS 3.666 7PF PH 2.5417N I OG 3.6875NIPS 2.4375N I PH 1.6875NFDG 3.5000NF P S 3.4 16 7NF PH 2.3333I NTR 30.8 9 5 8DOMI 132.6250SEXG 30.1 66 7
S T A N O A H O  OEV C ASES
9.8668 4810.4189 48
10.8967 48
10.1931 48
8.0 794 48
0.9998 48
0.8742 480.9107 480.9204 48
0.9302 481.0907 481.1139 481.0499 480.9029 48
0.9893 480.9187 480.9964 488.0 668 48
15.7272 48
16.4101 48
TABLE 11
Correlational Matrix For All Variables
DFPI DFPF dfni DFNF TRAI PIOG PIPS PI PH PFOG PFPS PFPH N IDG
DFPI 1•ooooo 0.48099 0.65239 3.56410 -0.00854 0 03361 -0.00839 -0.17266 -0.00761 -0.07264 -0.19539 -0 06534DFPF 0.46099 l•03300 0.58715 0.46764 0.10818 -0.051 06 0.16586 -0 .03012 0*13 757 0.06836 — 0•36176 -0 08800OFNI J.65239 3•5b7 15 1.33333 3.68027 0.0512J 0•04459 0.06190 -0 03466 -0 0 1591 0.03079 -0.37757 -0 00 151DFNF O.So'UO 0.4 8 7 6 4 0.6852 7 1 . ooooo -0.0010J 0.07855 0.013 73 -0 *1 3228 c.06549 0.04712 -0.18324 -0 39/9$TRAI -0.3 3 3 34 0•133 18 0.05123 -0.00133 1 • 0 0 0 3 3 -3.1 4392 0.17171 0•3282 1 -0.113 16 — 0 • 05662 3.18136 -0 24^33PID3 3.3 J3ol - 3.351 3 6 3•34459 3.3 7655 -0.14092 1.0 3000 — 0.66440 -0.552 5 7 -0 .38297 -0.312o7 -3.2642l 0 362 39PIPS -o .00039 3.16586 0.C8193 0.01J 73 0.17171 -0•66440 1.30000 0.5334 1 0.34 709 0.4664 J 0.J 6 6 3 2 0 1 1 745P I PH -J.17266 -3•030 12 -O.33460 -0• 10226 0.J2621 -3•5525 7 0.5 JJ4 l 1.03333 0•26813 0.36512 3.5 3995 3 1 1 9 J CPF tJ G — 3.3 3/61 3«1 J 7 5 7 — J • 3 ! j 9 1 >3 • 3 6 5 4 9 -0.11016 - 3.3 3297 0.34709 0• 2o6 1 3 1.C0030 0.74556 0.49542 0 154 3ePF PS -0.0 7264 0•Ob-336 0 • 3JO79 0.04 7 l 2 -0.05662 -0 •Jl 26 7 0.4 6 8 4 3 0 3*35 1 2 c 74556 l •OOOOO 0.60 1 16 0 0^->35PFPH - J.I >jJ9 — 0•06 1 7d -0.07757 -0.18324 0.16l36 -0.2642 l 0.Joe 32 0 5 39 9 5 0 4 9  54 2 0.6 3 1 1 o 1.33)03 0 4 349*N I t)G — 0 • ) 03 34 - J•3o3 3 ) - 3.3 J l 5 l -3.39799 -3.242)3 3.06239 3.11745 0 11933 0 1 5 4 J6 0.23535 0.43498 1#003 3CNIPS 0.31489 3•33893 -0.032 79 0.14140 0.33474 0•051 94 -0.00290 0.1 37 75 -c•03991 0.03030 -0.04412 -0 4609 /N 1 PH -0 . i 3 J15 -3 •3 8 1 43 J . J 7^45 3.17253 0.2639 7 3•10 165 —0.31665 0.25366 - c •2 1 924 -0.02533 0.3243l -0 353 JiN F .) >j J « 2 6 1 56 3•3 4 1 2d 3•17566 3.29961 -3.1 1 71 2 3.24 7J8 — 0•27362 - 3.24 79 7 -0 10515 -0.11560 -0.19717 -0 35 72 CNF PS 0.J 8 84 I 3•34 30 1 3.14607 3.203J6 -0.20353 3•245 16 -0.15455 -0.1504 7 -0 •03 145 0.06640 -0.06016 -0* 5<NFPH — 0 »09uo6 -3 .3 >u 32 -J.09145 — 0.219 95 0.15593 0•121 02 -0.06514 3•2 J323 0.02320 0 • l 4538 0 • J 1 *9 7 4 3 319 1/IN TPOUJ*1 -0.I3 132 - J•J^abd 3 . 1 J 2 3 6 -3.14466 -3.33441 0•177 33 -3.21565 0.3 3 342 -0 .0 75 0 5 -0.12949 3.02346 0•09 10.'— J » 3 ‘#4 6 8 O’•tt' -j .3 2 — i) . 0 4 5 3 7 0.15 t 60 -0.2 9 2 6  9— —o•04 4 15 0-. 1 2 265— — 0«0 22 3 4 --0.0^7+7 —O.0392 7 0.12000 -a.4-5 OliSF X*j 0.0 79 72 -0 •0 13 73 J.0J542 0•0 762J -0.026** 3 3.13 394 -0.3524l -0•3 3 1 5 6 -0 •J 7625 -0.23463 -3.17909 -3.157 72
N I P S N I PH NF DG N F P S N F P H I N T R OGM 1 S t  XG
6
7
D F P I 0 . 0 1 4 0 3 - 0 .  13 3 1 5 0.26 .1  56 0 . 0 8 8 4 1 - 0 . 0 9 6 6 6 - 0 . 1 0 1 0 2 - 0 . 0 9 4 6 0 0 . 0 7 9 7 2
D F P F 0 . 0  3 6 70 — 0 . J  0 l  4 J >. 04 1 26 0 . 0 4 0 3 1 - 0 . 3 9 6 3 2 - 0 . 0 2 6 5 8 0 . 1 5 5 0 2 - 0 . 0 1 0 7 0
D F N I - 3 . 3  ) 2 79 0•  3 7245 3 .  1 7->66 3 • 14 03  7 - 0 . 3 9 1 4 5 0 • 1 3 2 J 6 - 0 . 3 4 5 3 7 0 . 0 3 5 4 2
o  F u r 0 . 1 4 1 4 0 0 . 1 7 2 5 3 0 . 2 9 9 6 1 0 . 2 0 3 3 6 - 0 . 2 1 9 9 5 - 0 • 1 4 4 6 8 0 . 1 5 1 0 0 0 . 0 7 6 2 3
T R A I 0 . 1 0 4  74 0 . 2 6 3 9 7 - 0 .  1 l  712 - 3 . 2 3 3 5 3 0 • 1 5 5 9 J - 0 • 0 3 4 4 1 0 . 2 9 2 6 9 - 0 . 0 2 0 4 J
P I D G 0 • J 5 l 94 3 . 1 3 1 6 5 3 . 2 4  7 )8 3 . 2 4 5 1 6 0 . 1 2 1 3 2 3 . 1 7 7 3 3 - 0 . 3 4 4 1 5 0 . 1 3 ) 9 4
P I P S - 0 . 3  3 2 9 0 - 3 . 3 1 6 0 5 - 0 . 2 7 0 6 2 - 0 . 1 5 4 5 5 - 0 . 0 6 5 1 4 - 0 . 2 1 5 8 5 0 . 1 2 2 6 5 - 0 . 0 5 2 4  1
P  1 PH 0 . 1  6 7 75 0 . 2 5 0 6 6 - 3 . 2 4 7 9 / - C .  1 5 04  7 0 . 2 0 3 2 3 0 • 0 3 5 4 2 - 0 . 0 2 2 6 4 - 0  . J J l 56
P F  DG - 9 . 0 3 9 9 1 - 3 . 2 1 9 2 4 - 0 . 1 3 5 1 5 -  3 . 0  3 1 4 5 0 . 3 2 3 2  3 -  3 . 3  75 3 5 - 0 . 3 3 / 1 7 - J . 37^25
P F P S 0 . 0 0 ) 0 0 -  0 . 0  2 5 3 J - 0 .  1 l :>6 0 0 • 06o  4 0 0 . 1 4 5 3 0 - 0 . 1 2 9 4 9 - 0 . 0 3 9 2  7 - 0 . 2 3 4 6 3
P F P H - 0 . 0 4 4 1 2 U . 0 2 4  J 1 - 0 .  19 7 1 7 - 0 • Oo J  1 6 0 . 3 l 9 74 0 • 0 2 J 4 d 0 .  1 2 0 0 0 - 0 . 1  79 69
N ID G — 3 . 4 8 3 9  7 - 0 . 3 6 3 ) 5 -v ) .  35 72 3 -  3 . 2 2 3 5 2 0 . 3 1 9 1  7 0 . 3 9 1 3 2 - 0 . 1 5 3 1 5 - 0 . 1 5 7 7 2
N 1 PS 1 . 3 3 3  )0 0 . 5 5 1 3 0 3 . 1 3 7 9 6 0 . 4 3 2 5 6 0 . 2 3 3  3 7 0 • 0 9 3 9  1 0 . 0  79 73 0 . 2 6 1 1 0
N I PH 0 . 5 3 1 3 0 l . 0 0 3 0 0 0 . 1 0 7 1 9 0 . 2 6 2 9 3 0 . 3 0  745 0 . 1 4 4 4 2 0 . 3 0 8 9  7 0 .  1 5 7 2 5
N f  DG 0 . 3 3 / 9 6 0 .  13 719 1 . 0 0 3 3 0 3 . 7  7 2 *j 4 0 . 3 6 6 9 2 J  • l  3 7 9 8 0 . 0 4 3 7 6 3 • 1 9 5 2 6
N F P S 3 . 4  3 2 5 6 3 • 2 u 2 9 J 3• 7 72 34 l . 0 0 3 3 3 0 . 2 6 3 4 2 0 . 2 2 1 3 1 -  0 . 0 0 8 1 0 0 . 2 3 9 6 2
N F P H 0 . 2 0 3 3 7 0• 3 3 745 0 . 3 6 6  32 0 . 2 6 3 4 2 1 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 1  36 7 6 0 . 1 0 3 1 8 - 0 . 0 9 0 6 5
1 NT R 0 . 0 9 J 9  1 0 . 1 4 4 4 2 0 . 1 0 / 9 6 0 . 2 2 1 3 1 0 . 1 3 6 7 6 1 . 0 3 3 3 0 - 0 . 4 0 2 6 4 3 • 1 2 9 3 6
DOM I 0 . 3  79 73 0 • 3 0 0 9 7 3•  34 3 76 - 0 . 0 3 6 1 3 0 . 1 0 3 1 8 - 0 . 4 0 2 6 4 1 • o o o o o - 0 . 1 0 0 0 0
SEXG 0 . 2 6 1 1 6 0 . 1 5 7 2 5 0 . 1 9 5 2 0 0 . 2 0 9 8 2 - 0 . 0 9 C 6 5 0 . 1 2 9 3 6 - 0 . 1 0 0 0 8 1 . 0 0 0 0 0
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TABLE 12
Additional Multiple Regression Data 
Variable/Source beta SS df I? j>
1) A.B. Dif. Score: Pos.-Inhib.
Trait Anxiety + .04 7.65 1 .08 >.5
SCWT Interference -.18 122.47 1 1 . 2 0 .28
SCWT Percep.-Concept. Dom. -.17 10 0 .0 2 1 .98 .33
Sex-Guilt + .09 32.66 1 .32 >.5
Total Regression 187.13 4 .46 >.5
Within 4388.53 43
A.B. Dif. Score: Pos.-Facil.
Trait Anxiety +.06 18.42 1 .16 >.5
SCWT Interference +.03 4.84 1 .04 >.5
SCWT Percep.-Concep. Dom. +.15 87.51 1 .76 .39
Sex-Guilt + .003 0.00 1 .00 >.5
Total Regression 150.76 4 .33 >.5
Within 4951.24 43
A.B. Dif. Score: Neg.-Inhib.
Trait Anxiety + .05 15.25 1 . 1 2 >.5
SCWT Interference +.13 73.72 1 .58 .45
SCWT Percep.-Concept. Dom. -.008 .25 1 .002 >.5
Sex-Guilt + .02 2.54 1 .02 >.5
Total Regression 115.23 4 .23 >.5
Within 5465.44 43
A.B. Dif. Score: Neg.-FacilJ
Trait Anxiety -.04 6.52 1 .06 >.5
SCWT Interference - . 1 1 44.54 1 .41 >.5
SCWT Percep.-Concep. Dom. +.13 63.00 1 .58 .45
Sex-Guilt + . 1 1 53.23 1 .49 >.5
Total Regression 212.32 4 .49 >.5
Within 4670.93 43
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TABLE 13
Attentlonal Bias Difference Scores For Subjects Whose Self-Reports 
Were Classifiable As Imaginal/Global During Facilitation 
And Verbal/Analytic During Inhibition
Positive Affect
Subject No. Pos.-Inhib. Pos.-Facil.
23 -5 -3
27 +5 -15
33 +5 +10
43 -5 +1
45 - 1 1 - 1
47 - 2 1 - 2 1
48 -9 -5
57 +5 -7
58 -7 - 1 1
59 +5 +5
69 +16 -13
« 1 1 M= -2.0 M= -5
dependent t = . 929, = .38
Negative Affect
Subject No. eg. -Inhib. Neg.-Facil.
32 - 1 1 -13
45 +1 -5
48 - 1 1 - 1
62 -7 -9
65 - 2 1 - 2 1
n= 5 M= -9.8 M= -9
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TABLE 14
Analysis of Sbx Differences (df=l,46)
Variable Mean SD F p
1) Trait Anxiety .41 >.05
Males 38.8 8.2
Females 40.3 8.0
2) Sex-Guilt 3.68 .06
Males 25.8 14.9
Females 34.6 17.0
3) Stroop Interference 4.05 .05
Males 28.6 6.4
Females 33.2 9.0
4) SCWT Percep./Concep. Dorn. .13 >.5
Males 133.5 12.5
Females 131.8 18.7
5) Pos.-Inhib. Success .52 .47
Males 3.92 1.10
Females 4.13 .90
6) Pos.-Inhib. Psychological .11 >.5
Males 2.25 .94
Females 2.33 .82
7) Pos.-Inhib. Physical .03 >.5
Males 1.67 1.05
Females 1.63 .77
8) Pos.-Facil. Success .61 .44
Males 3.67 .96
Females 3.46 .88
9) Pos.-Facil. Psychological . 1 0 >.5
Males 3.71 1.08
Females 3.63 .77
10) Pos.-Facil. Physical .63 .43
Males 2.42 1.21
Females 2.67 .96
11) Neg.-Inhib. Success .02 >.5
Males 3.67 1.13
Females 3.71 1.12
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Variable Mean SD F £
12) Neg.-Inhib. Psychological 1.55 .22
Males 2.25 .99
Females 2.63 1 . 1 0
13) Neg.-Inhib. Physical 1.26 .27
Males 1.54 .66
Females 1.83 1 . 1 0
14) Neg.-Facil. Success 1.37 .25
Males 3.33 1.05
Females 3.67 .92
15) Neg.-Facil. Psychological 3.77 .06
Males 3.17 .87
Females 3.67 .92
16) Neg.-Facil. Physical 3.16 .08
Males 2.08 .88
Females 2.58 1.06
17) A.B. Dif. Score/Pos.-Inhib. .87 .35
Males 19.75 10.40
Females 17.08 9.32
18) A.B. Dif. Score/Pos.-Facil. .0 0 1 >.5
Males 17.04 9.57
Females 16.96 11.41
19) A.B. Dif. Score/Neg.-Inhib. .14 >.5
Males 16.75 10.53
Females 15.58 11.45
20) A.B. Dif. Score/Neg.-Facil. .06 >.5
Males 17.75 9.92
Females 17.00 10.65
REFERENCE MOTES
1. Corballis, M.C., & Morgan M, J. On the biological basis of 
human laterality: I: Evidence for a maturational left-right 
gradient. Manuscript in preparation, McGill University, 1978.
2. Morgan, J. J., & Corballis, M. C. On the biological basis of 
human laterality: II: The foechanisms of inheritance. Manuscript 
in preparation, University of Cambridge, 1978.
3. Gasparrlni, W. G., Satz, P., Heilman, K. M., & Coolidge, F. L. 
Hemispheric asymmetries of Effective processing as determined by 
the MMPI. Paper presented to the International Neuropsychological 
Society, 1977.
4. Yozawitz, A., & Bruder, G. E. Central auditory processing of
speech and non-speech stimuli in affective psychotics and schizo­
phrenics: A neuropsychological investigation. Paper presented to
International Neuropsychological Society, Minneapolis, 1978.
5. Bakan, P. Dreaming, REM sleep, and the right hemisphere. Paper 
presented to the Second International Congress of Sleep Research, 
Edinburgh, 1975.
6 . Burtle, V. Learning in the|appositional mind: Imagery in the 
treatment of depression.Unpublished doctoral dissertation, 
California School of Professional Psychology, 1975.
7. Tucker, D. M., Roth, R.S., & Shearer, S. L. Interaction between 
the cerebral hemispheres in}depression. Manuscript in preparation, 
University of North Dakota,j1978.
8 . Adair, M. J. Archaic linguistic symbols and cortico-hemispheric 
specialization. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of 
Missouri, 1974.
9. Ehrlichman, H., & Weinberger, A. Lateral eye movements and hemi­
spheric asymmetry: A critical review. Manuscript in preparation, 
City University of New York, 1977.
10. Ehrlichman, H., & Wiener, M. S. Dimensions of EEG asymmetry during 
covert mental activity. Paper presented to the American Psycho­
logical Association, San Frpncisco, 1977.
72
73
11. Ehrlichman, H., & Wiener, ML S. EEG asymmetry during spontaneous 
mental activity. Manuscripjt in preparation, City University of 
New York, 1978.
12. Tucker, D. M. Dialectical [processes in emotion and hemispheric 
function. Paper presented to International Neuropsychological 
Society, Minneapolis, 1978.
13. Goldstein, L., Sugerman, A. A., Marjerrison, G., & Stoltzfus, N. 
The EEG and differential hemispheric functions. Paper presented 
to Conference on Aspects of Transformation of Consciousness, 
Montreal, 1973.
14. Mosher, D. L. Forced-choice sex-guilt inventory. Unpublished 
manuscript, University of Connecticut.
15. Shevrin, H., & Smokier, I. A. Personal communication. University 
of Michigan, February 1978.
REFERENCES
Bakan, P. The eyes have it. Psychology Today, 1971, 4^, 64-96.
Bear, D. M., & Fedio, P. Quantitative analysis of interictal behavior 
in temporal lobe epilepsy. Archives of Neurology, 1977, 34^ , 454-467.
Black, F. W. Unilateral brain lesions and MMPI performance: A prelim­
inary study. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 1975, 4U, 87-93.
Blumstein, S., & Cooper, W. E. Hemispheric processing of intonation 
contours. Cortex, 1974, JLO, 146-158.
Bogen, J. E. The other side of the brain: II. An appositional mind. 
Bulletin of the Los Angeles Neurological Societies, 1969, _34, 135- 
162.
Bogen, J. E., & Bogen, G. M. The other side of the brain: III. The 
corpus callosum and creativity. Bulletin of the Los Angeles Neuro­
logical Society, 1969, _34, 191-220.
Carmon, A., & Nachson, I. Ear asymmetry in perception of emotional 
nonverbal stimuli. Acta Psychologies, 1973, 37, 351-357.
Chiofalo, N.»Dorr, 0., & Biedermann, N. Atypical depressive syndrome 
and EEG: Correlation between temporal focus, laterality, general­
ized abnormality and type of depression. EEG and Clinical Neuro­
physiology , 1977, A3, 493.
Cohen, H. D., Rosen, R. C., & Goldstein, L. Electroencephalographic 
laterality changes during human sexual orgasm. Archives of Sexual 
Behavior, 1976, _5, 189-199.
Davidson, R. J., & Schwartz, G. E. Patterns of cerebral lateralization 
during cardiac biofeedback vs. the self-regulation of emotions: Sex 
differences. Psychophysiology, 1976, ]J3, 62-68.
Delgado, J. M. Physical control of the mind: Toward a psychocivilized 
society. New York: Harper & Row, 1970.
d'Elia, G., & Perris, C. Cerebral functional dominance and depression:
An analysis of EEG amplitude in depressed patients. Acta Psychiatrica 
Scandanavia, 1973, 4J9, 191-197.
74
d'Elia, G., & Perris, C. Cerebral functional dominance and memory func­
tions: An analysis of EEG integrated amplitude in depressive psy- 
chotics. Acta Psychiatrica Scandanavia, 1974, Supplement 255, 143- 
157.
Denny-Brown, D., Meyer, J. S., & Horenstein, S. The significance of
perceptual rivalry resulting from parietal lesions. Brain, 1952, 75, 
433-471.
Dikman, S., & Reitan, R. M. MMPI correlates of localized cerebral 
lesions. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 1974, 39, 831-840.
Dikman, S., & Reitan, R. M. MMPI correlates of adaptive ability defi­
cits in patients with brain lesions. Journal of Nervous and Mental 
Disease, 1977, 165, 247-254.
75
Dimond, S. J. The double brain. London: Churchill Livingstone, 1972.
Dimond, S. J., Farrington, L., & Johnson, P. Differing emotional
response from right and left hemispheres. Nature, 1976, 261, 690- 
692.
Donchin, E., Kutas, M., & McCarthy, G. Electrocortical indicies of
hemispheric utilization. In S. Harnad et al. (Eds.), Lateralization 
in the nervous system. New York: Academic Press, 1977.
Ferenczi, S. An attempted explanation of some hysterical stigmata. In 
S. Ferenczi (Ed.), Further contributions to the theory and technique 
of psychoanalysis. London: Hogarth Press, 1926.
Flor-Henry, P. Lateralized temporal-limbic dysfunction and psycho­
pathology. Annals of the New York Academy of Science, 1976, 280, 
777-797.
Gainotti, G. Reactions "catastrophiques" et manifestations d'indiffer­
ence au cours des atteintes cerebrales. Neuropsychologia, 1969, 
195-204.
Gainotti, G. Emotional behavior and hemispheric side of the lesion. 
Cortex, 1972, Q, 41-55.
Galaburda, A. M., LeMay, M., Kemper, T. L., & Geschwind, N. Right-left 
asymmetries in the brain: Structural differences between the hemi­
spheres may underlie cerebral dominance. Science, 1978, 199, 852- 
856.
Galin, D. Implications for psychiatry of left and right cerebral
specialization. Archives of General Psychiatry, 1974, 31, 572-583.
Galin, D. Lateral specialization and psychiatric issues: Speculations 
on development and the evolution of consciousness. Annals of the 
New York Academy of Sciences, 1977, 281, 397-411.
Galin, D., Diamond, R., & Braff, D. Lateralization of conversion 
symptoms: More frequent on the left. American Journal of Psy­
chiatry, 1977, 134, 578-580.
Galin, D., & Ornstein, R. Lateral specialization of cognitive mode: An 
EEG study. Psychophysiology, 1972, _9, 412-418.
Gardner, H. What we know (and don't know) about the two halves of the 
brain. Harvard Magazine, March-April 1978, 24-27.
Gardner, R. W., Holzman, P. S., Klein, G. S., Linton, H. B., & Spence,
D. P. Cognitive control: A study of individual consistencies in 
cognitive behavior. Psychological Issues, 1959, _1, 1-185.
Gazzangia, M. S. The split brain in man. Scientific American, 1967, 
217, 24-29.
76
Goldstein, K. The organism. New York: American Book Co., 1939.
Goleman, D. Split-brain psychology: Fad of the year. Psychology 
Today, 1977, 10, 89-151.
Gur, R. Conjugate lateral eye movements as an index of hemispheric
activation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1975, 31, 
751-757.
Gur, R. Left hemisphere dysfunction and left hemisphere overactivation 
in schizophrenia. Journal <t>f Abnormal Psychology, 1978, H7, 226- 
238.
Gur, R. E., & Gur, R. C. Defense mechanisms, psychosomatic symptom­
atology, and conjugate lateral eye movements. Journal of Consulting 
and Clinical Psychology, 1975, 43, 416-420.
Gur, R. E., & Gur, R. C. Correlates of conjugate lateral eye movements 
in man. In S. Harnad et al. (Eds.), Lateralization in the nervous 
system. New York: Academic Press, 1977.
Haggard, M. P., & Parkinson, A. M. Stimulus and task factors as deter­
minants of ear advantages. Quarterly Journal of Experimental 
Psychology, 1976, 2^ 3, 168-177.
Hall, M. M., Hall, G. C., & Lavoie, P. Ideation in patients with
unilateral or bilateral midline brain lesions. Journal of Abnormal 
Psychology, 1968, _73, 526-531.
Harman, D. W., & Ray, W. J. Hemispheric activity during affective
verbal stimuli: An EEG study. Neuropsychologia, 1977, JJ5, 457-460.
Harnad, S., Doty, R. W., Goldstein, L., Jaynes, J., & Krauthamer, G. 
Lateralization in the nervous system. New York: Academic Press, 
1977.
Hecaen, H. Clinical symptomatology in right and left hemispheric
lesions. In V. B. Mountcastle (Ed.), Interhemispheric Relations and 
Cerebral Dominance. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962.
Hecaen, H., & Ajuriaguerra, J. Lefthandedness. New York: Grune & 
Stratton, 1964.
Heilman, K. M., Scholes, R., & Watson, R. T. Auditory affective
agnosia. Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery, and Psychiatry, 1975, 
38, 69-72.
Hiscock, M. Effects of examiners location and subjects anxiety on gaze 
laterality. Neuropsychologia, 1977, _15, 409-416.
Holt, R. R. Cognitive controls and primary processes. Journal of Psy­
chological Researches, 1960, 8., 105-112.
Isaacson, R. L. The limbic system. New York: Plenum Press, 1974.
Jensen, A. R. Scoring the Stroop test. Acta Psychologica, 1965, 24, 
398-408.
Jensen, A. R., & Rohwer, W. D. The Stroop color-word test: A review. 
Acta Psychologica, 1966, 25^, 36-93.
Kerlinger, F. N., & Pedhazur, E. J. Multiple regression in behavioral 
research. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1973.
Kimura, D. Dual function asymmetry of the brain in visual perception. 
Neuropsychologia, 1966, 4^, 275-285.
Kimura, D. Functional asymmetry of the brain in dichotic listening. 
Cortex, 1967, J3, 163-178.
King, F. L., & Kimura, D. Left ear superiority in dichotic perception 
of vocal nonverbal sound. Canadian Journal of Psychology, 1972, 26, 
111-116.
Kinsbourne, M. The cerebral basis of lateral asymmetries in attention. 
Acta Psychologica, 1970, _33, 193-201.
Kinsbourne, M. Eye and head turning indicate cerebral lateralization. 
Science, 1972, 176, 539-541.
77
Lashley, K. S. In search of the engram. New York: Academic Press, 
1950.
Levy, J. ’ Possible basis for the evolution of lateral specialization of 
the human brain. Nature, 1969, 224, 614-615.
Lezak, M. D. Neuropsychological assessment. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1976.
Marjerrison, G., James, J., & Reichert, H. Unilateral and bilateral 
ECT: EEG findings. Canadian Psychiatric Association Journal, 1975, 
20, 257-266.
Miller, N. E. Motivational effects of brain stimulation and drugs. 
Federation Proceedings, 1960, _19, 846-854.
Milner, B. Discussion of the Subject: Experimental analysis of cere­
bral dominance in man. In C. H. Millikan & F. L. Darley (Eds.),
Brain mechanisms underlying speech and language. New York: Grune & 
Stratton, 1967.
Morgan, A. H., McDonald, P. J., & McDonald, H. Differences in uni­
lateral alpha activity as a function of experimental tasks with a 
note on lateral eye movementis and hypnotizability. Neuropsychologia, 
1971, 9, 459-469.
Nebes, R. D. Hemispheric specialization in commisurotomized man. 
Psychological Bulletin, 1974, _81_, 1-14.
Olds, J., & Milner, P. Positive reinforcement produced by electrical 
stimulation of septal area and other regions of rat brain. Journal 
of Comparative and Physiological Psychology, 1954, _47, 419-427.
Papez, J. W. A proposed mechanism of emotion. Archives of Neurology 
and Psychiatry, 1937, 3J5, 725-743.
Penfield, W. The excitable coytex of conscious man. Liverpool:
Liverpool University Press, 1958.
Perris, C. Averaged evoked responses (AER) in patients with affective 
disorders. Acta Psychiatrica Scandanavia, 1974, Supplement 255,
89-98.
Reichert, H., Benjamin, J., Keegan, D., & Marjerrison, G. Bilateral and 
non-dominant unilateral ECT: Part I— Therapeutic efficacy. Canadian 
Psychiatric Association Journal, 1976, 21, 69-78.
Reitan, R. M. Psychological deficits resulting from cerebral lesions in 
man. In J. M. Warren & K. Akert (Eds.), The frontal granular cortex 
and behavior. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964.
Reubens, A. B. Anatomical asymmetries of human cerebral cortex. In S. 
Harnad et al. (Eds.), Lateralization in the nervous system. New York: 
Academic Press, 1977.
Rosenthal, R., & Bigelow, C. B. Quantitative brain measurements in 
chronic schizophrenics. British Journal of Psychiatry, 1972, 121, 
259-264.
78
Rossi, G. F., & Rosadini, G. Experimental analysis of cerebral dominance 
in man. In C. H. Millikan & F. L. Darley (Eds.), Brain mechanisms 
underlying speech and language. New York: Grune & Stratton, 1967.
Safer, M. A., & Leventhal, H. Ear differences in evaluating emotional 
tones of voice and verbal content. Journal of Experimental Psy­
chology: Human Perception and Performance, 1977, 31, 75-82.
Schwartz, G. E., Davidson, R. J., & Maer, F. Right hemisphere laterali­
zation for emotion in the human brain: Interactions with cognition. 
Science, 1975, 190, 286-290.
Schwartz, G. E., Davidson, R. J., Maer, F., & Bromfield, E. Patterns of 
hemispheric dominance in musical, emotional, verbal and spatial tasks. 
Psychophysiology, 1974, 11, 227.
Semmes, J. Hemispheric specialization: A possible clue to mechanism. 
Neuropsychologia, 1968, 11-26.
Spielberger, C. D., Gorsuch, R., & Lushene, R. E. Manual for the state- 
trait anxiety inventory. Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologists 
Press, 1970.
Springer, S. P. Tachistoscopic and dichotic listening investigations of 
laterality in normal human subjects. In S. Harnad et al. (Eds.), 
Lateralization in the nervous system. New York: Academic Press, 1977.
Stern, D. B. Handedness and the lateral distribution of conversion
reactions. Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 1977, 164, 122-128.
79
Stroop, J. R. Studies of interference in serial verbal reactions.
Journal of Experimental Psychology, 1935, 3J3, 643-662.
Terzian, H. Behavioral and EEG effects of intracarotid sodium amytal 
injection. Acta Neurochis, 1964, L2, 230-239.
Tucker, D. M., Antes, J. R., Stenslie, C. E., & Barnhardt, T. M.
Anxiety and lateral cerebral function. Journal of Abnormal Psy­
chology, in press, 1978.
Tucker, D. M., Roth, R. S., Arneson, B. A., & Buckingham, V. Right
hemisphere activation during stress. Neuropsychologia, 1977, 13, 1-3.
Tucker, D. M., Shearer, S. L., & Murray, J. D. Hemispheric specializa­
tion and cognitive behavior therapy. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 
1977, 1, 263-273.
Tucker, D. M., Watson, R. T., & Heilman, K. M. Affective discrimination 
and evocation in patients with right parietal disease. Neurology,
1976, 26, 354.
80
Vogel, G. W. , Thompson, E., Thurmond, A., & Rivers, B. The effect of 
REM deprivation on depression. Psychosomatics, 1973, 14_, 104-107.
Vogel, G. W., Thurmond, A., Gibbons, P., Sloan, K., Boyd, M. , & Walker, 
M. REM sleep reduction effects on depression syndromes. Archives of 
General Psychiatry, 1975, 32^ 765-777.
Vogel, W. Some effects of brai^ lesions on MMPI profiles. Journal of
Consulting Psychology, 1962,
Wada, J., & Rasmussen, T. Intr 
the lateralization of cerebr 
surgery, 1960, 17, 266-282.
Wechsler, A. I. The effect of 
emotionally charged vs. neut 
23, 130-135.
26, 412-415.
acarotid injection of sodium amytal for 
al speech dominance. Journal of Neuro-
organic brain disease on recall of 
ral narrative texts. Neurology, 1973,
Woods, D. J. Conjugate lateral eye movements, repression-sensitization, 
and emotional style: Sex interactions. Journal of Clinical Psy­
chology, 1977, 33, 839-841.
